- the elements of negligent homicide are (1) that a certain person is dead; (2) that this death resulted from an act or failure to act of the accused; (3) that the killing was unlawful; (4) that the accused’s act or failure to act that caused the death amounted to simple negligence; and (5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces
- negligent homicide is not an LIO of involuntary manslaughter; prejudice to good order and discipline and service discredit are not subsumed within the elements of involuntary manslaughter
CAAF Opinion Digest · III.A.85 · Crimes Pre-2019 offenses
Article 134 -- Negligent Homicide
Offenses committed before 1 January 2019 (pre-2016 amendment) — opinions from the 1999 through 2020 Terms of Court.
3 digested opinions, 2003–2010 Terms
2010 (September Term)
- negligent homicide under Article 134, UCMJ, requires: (1) that a certain person is dead; (2) that this death resulted from an act or failure to act of the accused; (3) that the killing by the accused was unlawful; (4) that the accused’s act or failure to act that caused the death amounted to simple negligence; and (5) that, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces
- assuming without deciding that simple negligence is subsumed within premeditation, it is nonetheless apparent that negligent homicide contains additional elements that are not elements of premeditated murder: the terminal elements of Article 134, UCMJ, prejudice to good order or service discredit; therefore, negligent homicide is not an LIO of premeditated murder
2003
- simple negligence is the absence of due care, that is, an act or omission of a person who is under a duty to use due care which exhibits a lack of that degree of care of the safety of others which a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances
- the CCA concluded that appellant’s delivery of her baby while sitting on a toilet with nothing beneath her but a hard ceramic tile floor was the specific act of negligence that was the proximate cause of the baby’s death; once the CCA reached a legal conclusion that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of fact and law to establish appellant’s negligence as the proximate cause of death, it was not necessary for the court to make any further determination as to the specific cause of death
- appellant realized while she was in the bathroom that she was about to give birth; she was in sufficient control of her mental and physical faculties to remove her clothing and shoes; knowing that childbirth was underway, she chose to sit on the toilet seat; based on these facts, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was negligent for appellant to position herself on the toilet seat instead of on the floor, where the danger of injury to her baby would have been lessened; we further hold that a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant’s negligence played a material role in the victim’s decease; thus, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction of negligent homicide in violation of Article 134, UCMJ
- we reject appellant’s argument that the failure of the doctors to diagnose appellant’s pregnancy was an intervening proximate cause of the baby’s death sufficient to relieve appellant of criminal liability; even if the doctors negligently failed to diagnose appellant’s pregnancy, their negligence was, at best, a contributing cause; they did not intervene between appellant’s negligent birthing and the ultimate death of her baby; even if appellant did not know that she was in labor when she went into the bathroom, she admitted that she saw the baby’s head emerge while she was sitting on the toilet; after she realized that she was giving birth, she chose to remain in a position that significantly increased the danger to the baby; notwithstanding any negligence by the doctors before she went into labor, her lack of due care for the safety of her baby, once labor began, played a material role in the victim’s decease
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Last updated by the court: Oct 13, 2026 · mirrored Oct 29, 2026 · digest page IIIA85 · Always confirm a holding against the opinion itself (linked from each case name).