- although it is true that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal, Congress is not required to include an explicit mens rea in every article of the UCMJ
- when a statute is silent as to mens rea, an appellate court only reads into the statute that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct; a statute’s silence can be indicative of a general intent scienter
- general intent merely requires the intent to perform the actus reus even though the actor does not desire the consequences that result
CAAF Opinion Digest · III.A · Crimes Pre-2019 offenses
Generally
Offenses committed before 1 January 2019 (pre-2016 amendment) — opinions from the 1999 through 2020 Terms of Court.
For offenses on or after 1 January 2019 see
III.AA — Generally.
4 digested opinions, 2015–2018 Terms
2018 (October Term)
- that a crime is comprised of both an actus reus and a mens rea necessarily means both components must exist at the time an offense is committed if the offense is to amount to a crime at all; although a criminal actor must possess the requisite intent when he commits a criminal act, circumstantial evidence from before or after the act may be used to prove an actor had the requisite intent at the time of the act
- in determining the mens rea applicable to an offense, a court must first discern whether one is stated in the text, or, failing that, whether Congress impliedly intended a particular mens rea
- the existence of a mens rea is presumed in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary
- a general intent mens rea is not the absence of a mens rea, and such offenses remain viable in appropriate circumstances
- the appropriate mens rea can be implied from context
2015 (September Term)
- it is a fundamental principle of criminal law that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal; this does not mean that an accused must know that his actions constitute criminal conduct; rather, an accused must have knowledge of the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense
- the general rule is that a guilty mind is a necessary element in the charge sheet and proof of every crime
- even when a mens rea (guilty mind) requirement is not explicitly included in a criminal statute, that does not necessarily mean that such a requirement can be dispensed with; rather, generally speaking, criminal statutes should be interpreted by courts as still including broadly applicable mens rea requirements, even where the statute does not contain them
- an inference of a mens rea requirement by a court is not merited when there is an indication of congressional intent to the contrary
- in inferring a mens rea requirement in a statute that is otherwise silent, courts must only read into the statute that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct
- in some instances, the mere requirement in a statute that a defendant commit an act with knowledge of certain facts — i.e., that the defendant possessed general intent — is enough to ensure that innocent conduct can be separated from wrongful conduct
- general intent requires knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime
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Last updated by the court: Oct 13, 2026 · mirrored Oct 29, 2026 · digest page IIIA0 · Always confirm a holding against the opinion itself (linked from each case name).