- although appellant contends that the charged attempted sexual assault specification (an attempted sexual assault of a female airman by penetrating her mouth with his penis without her consent) pleaded the complete offense as the overt act, it is implausible to think that the government would have charged an attempt in lieu of the completed offense if the attempt required them to prove the completed offense; in any event, it appears that both parties at trial reasonably understood that the challenged language did not describe an expressly alleged overt act but instead served to provide proper notice of the predicate offense; the government argued that that there were two overt acts – the act of holding the victim's head down toward appellant's lap and the act of undoing his pants prior to holding the victim's head down toward his crotch; the defense argued that those acts did not occur; at trial, defense counsel did not move for a bill of particulars, made no objection based on a lack of notice as to what to defend against, and did not object to the military judge's instructions to the members regarding the specification; all of this indicates that the parties at trial understood that the challenged language did not describe an expressly alleged overt act, but instead served to provide proper notice of the predicate offense; while the specification could have been drafted more clearly, it was not so poorly drafted that there was no conceivable interpretation that rendered the charge invalid, nor does it appear any of the parties viewed it as invalid at the trial; accordingly, there was no error, plain or otherwise
- in this case, appellant conviction for attempted sexual assault of a female airman by penetrating her mouth with his penis without her consent was legally sufficient where the evidence established both that appellant undid his pants and forced the victim's head down toward his lap, and either of these actions, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, provided the overt act necessary to prove the charge of attempted sexual assault
CAAF Opinion Digest · III.AA.4 · Crimes Offenses on/after 1 Jan 2019
Article 80 - Attempts
Offenses committed on or after 1 January 2019 (post-2016 amendment) — opinions from the 2021 Term of Court forward.
For offenses before 1 January 2019 see
III.A — Article 80 - Attempts.
3 digested opinions, 2021–2024 Terms
2024 (October Term)
2022 (October Term)
- attempted conspiracy is a viable offense under the UCMJ
2021 (October Term)
- to be guilty of an attempt, an accused must (1) have had the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) have taken a substantial step toward its completion
Source and status
This is a verbatim mirror of the Opinion Digest and opinions tables published by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The headnotes are the court staff’s summaries of the opinions, reproduced as published; they are not the opinions themselves and not this site’s commentary. Nothing here is edited on this site.
Last updated by the court: Oct 13, 2026 · mirrored Oct 29, 2026 · digest page IIIAA4 · Always confirm a holding against the opinion itself (linked from each case name).