Summary of changes

Article 118 — Murder

The text as it stood in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition beside the current text, provision by provision, with every recorded amendment and the authority behind it — the whole Article in one view.

2 amended 0 added 0 removed 45 unchanged 3 authority-backed edits · recorded 2026-07-10 – 2026-07-10

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Provisions
56.a. amended
Version history
Original text
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—
Current text
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when such person—
All changes since the original (removed / added)
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—such person—
Step-by-step: 1 recorded edit
VersionDateAuthorityNoteEditor
v2 2026-07-10 Public Law No. 118-31 (NDAA 2024) (Public Law, eff. 2023-12-23) admin
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—such person—
56.a.(1) unchanged
Original text
has a premeditated design to kill;
Current text
has a premeditated design to kill;
56.a.(2) unchanged
Original text
intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
Current text
intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
56.a.(3) unchanged
Original text
is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or
Current text
is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or
56.a.(4) amended
Version history
Original text
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.
Current text
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), such person shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct, unless such person is otherwise sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement entered into between the parties under section 853a of this title (article 53a).
All changes since the original (removed / added)
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), hesuch person shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.direct, unless such person is otherwise sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement entered into between the parties under section 853a of this title (article 53a).
Step-by-step: 2 recorded edits
VersionDateAuthorityNoteEditor
v2 2026-07-10 Public Law No. 118-31 (NDAA 2024) (Public Law, eff. 2023-12-23) admin
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), hesuch person shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.
v3 2026-07-10 Public Law No. 118-31 (NDAA 2024) (Public Law, eff. 2023-12-23) admin
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), such person shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.direct, unless such person is otherwise sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement entered into between the parties under section 853a of this title (article 53a).
56.b. unchanged
Original text
Elements.
Current text
Elements.
56.b.(1) unchanged
Original text
Premeditated murder.
Current text
Premeditated murder.
56.b.(1)(a) unchanged
Original text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
Current text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
56.b.(1)(b) unchanged
Original text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
Current text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
56.b.(1)(c) unchanged
Original text
That the killing was unlawful; and
Current text
That the killing was unlawful; and
56.b.(1)(d) unchanged
Original text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused had a premeditated design to kill.
Current text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused had a premeditated design to kill.
56.b.(2) unchanged
Original text
Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
Current text
Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
56.b.(2)(a) unchanged
Original text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
Current text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
56.b.(2)(b) unchanged
Original text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
Current text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
56.b.(2)(c) unchanged
Original text
That the killing was unlawful; and
Current text
That the killing was unlawful; and
56.b.(2)(d) unchanged
Original text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a person.
Current text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused had the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a person.
56.b.(3) unchanged
Original text
Act inherently dangerous to another.
Current text
Act inherently dangerous to another.
56.b.(3)(a) unchanged
Original text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
Current text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
56.b.(3)(b) unchanged
Original text
That the death resulted from the intentional act of the accused;
Current text
That the death resulted from the intentional act of the accused;
56.b.(3)(c) unchanged
Original text
That this act was inherently dangerous to another and showed a wanton disregard for human life;
Current text
That this act was inherently dangerous to another and showed a wanton disregard for human life;
56.b.(3)(d) unchanged
Original text
That the accused knew that death or great bodily harm was a probable consequence of the act; and
Current text
That the accused knew that death or great bodily harm was a probable consequence of the act; and
56.b.(3)(e) unchanged
Original text
That the killing was unlawful.
Current text
That the killing was unlawful.
56.b.(4) unchanged
Original text
During certain offenses.
Current text
During certain offenses.
56.b.(4)(a) unchanged
Original text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
Current text
That a certain named or described person is dead;
56.b.(4)(b) unchanged
Original text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
Current text
That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused;
56.b.(4)(c) unchanged
Original text
That the killing was unlawful; and
Current text
That the killing was unlawful; and
56.b.(4)(d) unchanged
Original text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson.
Current text
That, at the time of the killing, the accused was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson.
56.c. unchanged
Original text
Explanation.
Current text
Explanation.
56.c.(1) unchanged
Original text
In general.
Killing a human being is unlawful when done without justification or excuse. See R.C.M. 916. Whether an unlawful killing constitutes murder or a lesser offense depends upon the circumstances. The offense is committed at the place of the act or omission although the victim may have died elsewhere. Whether death occurs at the time of the accused’s act or omission, or at some time thereafter, it must have followed from an injury received by the victim which resulted from the act or omission.
Current text
In general.
Killing a human being is unlawful when done without justification or excuse. See R.C.M. 916. Whether an unlawful killing constitutes murder or a lesser offense depends upon the circumstances. The offense is committed at the place of the act or omission although the victim may have died elsewhere. Whether death occurs at the time of the accused’s act or omission, or at some time thereafter, it must have followed from an injury received by the victim which resulted from the act or omission.
56.c.(2) unchanged
Original text
Premeditated murder.
Current text
Premeditated murder.
56.c.(2)(a) unchanged
Original text
Premeditation.
A murder is not premeditated unless the thought of taking life was consciously conceived and the act or omission by which it was taken was intended. Premeditated murder is murder committed after the formation of a specific intent to kill someone and consideration of the act intended. It is not necessary that the intention to kill have been entertained for any particular or considerable length of time. When a fixed purpose to kill has been deliberately formed, it is immaterial how soon afterwards it is put into execution. The existence of premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances.
Current text
Premeditation.
A murder is not premeditated unless the thought of taking life was consciously conceived and the act or omission by which it was taken was intended. Premeditated murder is murder committed after the formation of a specific intent to kill someone and consideration of the act intended. It is not necessary that the intention to kill have been entertained for any particular or considerable length of time. When a fixed purpose to kill has been deliberately formed, it is immaterial how soon afterwards it is put into execution. The existence of premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances.
56.c.(2)(b) unchanged
Original text
Transferred premeditation.
When an accused with a premeditated design attempted to unlawfully kill a certain person, but, by mistake or inadvertence, killed another person, the accused is still criminally responsible for a premeditated murder, because the premeditated design to kill is transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim.
Current text
Transferred premeditation.
When an accused with a premeditated design attempted to unlawfully kill a certain person, but, by mistake or inadvertence, killed another person, the accused is still criminally responsible for a premeditated murder, because the premeditated design to kill is transferred from the intended victim to the actual victim.
56.c.(2)(c) unchanged
Original text
Intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication ( see R.C.M. 916(l)(2)) not amounting to legal insanity may reduce premeditated murder (Article 118(1)) to unpremeditated murder (Article 118(2) or (3)) but it does not reduce either premeditated murder or unpremeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or any other lesser offense.
Current text
Intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication ( see R.C.M. 916(l)(2)) not amounting to legal insanity may reduce premeditated murder (Article 118(1)) to unpremeditated murder (Article 118(2) or (3)) but it does not reduce either premeditated murder or unpremeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or any other lesser offense.
56.c.(3) unchanged
Original text
Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
Current text
Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
56.c.(3)(a) unchanged
Original text
Intent.
An unlawful killing without premeditation is also murder when the accused had either an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. It may be inferred that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of an act purposely done. Hence, if a person does an intentional act likely to result in death or great bodily injury, it may be inferred that death or great bodily injury was intended. The intent need not be directed toward the person killed, or exist for any particular time before commission of the act, or have previously existed at all. It is sufficient that it existed at the time of the act or omission (except if death is inflicted in the heat of a sudden passion caused by adequate provocation – see paragraph 57). For example, a person committing housebreaking who strikes and kills the householder attempting to prevent flight can be guilty of murder even if the householder was not seen until the moment before striking the fatal blow.
Current text
Intent.
An unlawful killing without premeditation is also murder when the accused had either an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. It may be inferred that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of an act purposely done. Hence, if a person does an intentional act likely to result in death or great bodily injury, it may be inferred that death or great bodily injury was intended. The intent need not be directed toward the person killed, or exist for any particular time before commission of the act, or have previously existed at all. It is sufficient that it existed at the time of the act or omission (except if death is inflicted in the heat of a sudden passion caused by adequate provocation – see paragraph 57). For example, a person committing housebreaking who strikes and kills the householder attempting to prevent flight can be guilty of murder even if the householder was not seen until the moment before striking the fatal blow.
56.c.(3)(b) unchanged
Original text
Great bodily harm.
“Great bodily harm” means serious injury; it does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but it does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other serious bodily injuries. It is synonymous with the term “grievous bodily harm.”
Current text
Great bodily harm.
“Great bodily harm” means serious injury; it does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but it does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other serious bodily injuries. It is synonymous with the term “grievous bodily harm.”
56.c.(3)(c) unchanged
Original text
Intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication not amounting to legal insanity does not reduce unpremeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or any other lesser offense.
Current text
Intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication not amounting to legal insanity does not reduce unpremeditated murder to manslaughter (Article 119) or any other lesser offense.
56.c.(4) unchanged
Original text
Act inherently dangerous to others.
Current text
Act inherently dangerous to others.
56.c.(4)(a) unchanged
Original text
Wanton disregard of human life.
Intentionally engaging in an act inherently dangerous to another— although without an intent to cause the death of or great bodily harm to any particular person, or even with a wish that death will not be caused—may also constitute murder if the act shows wanton disregard of human life. Such disregard is characterized by heedlessness of the probable consequences of the act or omission, or indifference to the likelihood of death or great bodily harm. Examples include throwing a live grenade toward another in jest or flying an aircraft very low over one or more persons to cause alarm.
Current text
Wanton disregard of human life.
Intentionally engaging in an act inherently dangerous to another— although without an intent to cause the death of or great bodily harm to any particular person, or even with a wish that death will not be caused—may also constitute murder if the act shows wanton disregard of human life. Such disregard is characterized by heedlessness of the probable consequences of the act or omission, or indifference to the likelihood of death or great bodily harm. Examples include throwing a live grenade toward another in jest or flying an aircraft very low over one or more persons to cause alarm.
56.c.(4)(b) unchanged
Original text
Knowledge.
The accused must know that death or great bodily harm was a probable consequence of the inherently dangerous act. Such knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Current text
Knowledge.
The accused must know that death or great bodily harm was a probable consequence of the inherently dangerous act. Such knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
56.c.(5) unchanged
Original text
During certain offenses.
Current text
During certain offenses.
56.c.(5)(a) unchanged
Original text
In general.
The commission or attempted commission of any of the offenses listed in Article 118(4) is likely to result in homicide, and when an unlawful killing occurs as a consequence of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of these offenses, the killing is murder. Under these circumstances it is not a defense that the killing was unintended or accidental.
Current text
In general.
The commission or attempted commission of any of the offenses listed in Article 118(4) is likely to result in homicide, and when an unlawful killing occurs as a consequence of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of these offenses, the killing is murder. Under these circumstances it is not a defense that the killing was unintended or accidental.
56.c.(5)(b) unchanged
Original text
Separate offenses.
The perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson may be charged separately from the homicide.
Current text
Separate offenses.
The perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson may be charged separately from the homicide.
56.d. unchanged
Original text
Maximum punishment.
Current text
Maximum punishment.
56.d.(1) unchanged
Original text
Article 118(1) or (4)—death. Mandatory minimum—imprisonment for life with the eligibility for parole.
Current text
Article 118(1) or (4)—death. Mandatory minimum—imprisonment for life with the eligibility for parole.
56.d.(2) unchanged
Original text
Article 118(2) or (3)—such punishment other than death as a court-martial may direct.
Current text
Article 118(2) or (3)—such punishment other than death as a court-martial may direct.
56.e. unchanged
Original text
Sample specification.
In that ______________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about ______ 20___, (with premeditation) (while (perpetrating) (attempting to perpetrate)__________) murder __________________ by means of (shooting (him) (her) with a rifle) (_________).
Current text
Sample specification.
In that ______________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about ______ 20___, (with premeditation) (while (perpetrating) (attempting to perpetrate)__________) murder __________________ by means of (shooting (him) (her) with a rifle) (_________).

“Original text” is the state captured the first time a provision was edited under change tracking — i.e. the text as published in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition. Provisions edited without being “marked as changed” (typos, formatting) are not recorded here; see the recent revisions feed and the site-wide changes log.