Summary of changes

Article 90 — Willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer

The text as it stood in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition beside the current text, provision by provision, with every recorded amendment and the authority behind it — the whole Article in one view.

0 amended 0 added 0 removed 30 unchanged
No changes recorded for this Article — its text is the same as the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition.
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Changed only
Provisions
16.a. unchanged
Original text
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who willfully disobeys a lawful command of that person’s superior commissioned officer shall be punished—
Current text
Text of statute.
Any person subject to this chapter who willfully disobeys a lawful command of that person’s superior commissioned officer shall be punished—
16.a.(1) unchanged
Original text
if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct; and
Current text
if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct; and
16.a.(2) unchanged
Original text
if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.
Current text
if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.
16.b. unchanged
Original text
Elements.
Current text
Elements.
16.b.(1) unchanged
Original text
That the accused received a lawful command from a superior commissioned officer;
Current text
That the accused received a lawful command from a superior commissioned officer;
16.b.(2) unchanged
Original text
That this officer was the superior commissioned officer of the accused;
Current text
That this officer was the superior commissioned officer of the accused;
16.b.(3) unchanged
Original text
That the accused then knew that this officer was the accused’s superior commissioned officer; and
Current text
That the accused then knew that this officer was the accused’s superior commissioned officer; and
16.b.(4) unchanged
Original text
That the accused willfully disobeyed the lawful command.
Current text
That the accused willfully disobeyed the lawful command.
16.b.(4)|N unchanged
Original text
[Note: if the offense was committed in time of war, add the following element]
Current text
[Note: if the offense was committed in time of war, add the following element]
16.b.(5) unchanged
Original text
That the offense was committed in time of war.
Current text
That the offense was committed in time of war.
16.c. unchanged
Original text
Explanation.
Current text
Explanation.
16.c.(1) unchanged
Original text
Superior commissioned officer.
The definition in subparagraph 15.c.(1) applies here.
Current text
Superior commissioned officer.
The definition in subparagraph 15.c.(1) applies here.
16.c.(2) unchanged
Original text
Disobeying superior commissioned officer.
Current text
Disobeying superior commissioned officer.
16.c.(2)(a) unchanged
Original text
Lawfulness of the order.
Current text
Lawfulness of the order.
16.c.(2)(a)(i) unchanged
Original text
Inference of lawfulness.
An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime.
Current text
Inference of lawfulness.
An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime.
16.c.(2)(a)(ii) unchanged
Original text
Determination of lawfulness.
The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge.
Current text
Determination of lawfulness.
The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge.
16.c.(2)(a)(iii) unchanged
Original text
Authority of issuing officer.
The commissioned officer issuing the order must have authority to give such an order. Authorization may be based on law, regulation, custom of the Service, or applicable order to direct, coordinate, or control the duties, activities, health, welfare, morale, or discipline of the accused.
Current text
Authority of issuing officer.
The commissioned officer issuing the order must have authority to give such an order. Authorization may be based on law, regulation, custom of the Service, or applicable order to direct, coordinate, or control the duties, activities, health, welfare, morale, or discipline of the accused.
16.c.(2)(a)(iv) unchanged
Original text
Relationship to military duty.
The order must relate to military duty, which includes all activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the Service. The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article.
Current text
Relationship to military duty.
The order must relate to military duty, which includes all activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the Service. The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article.
16.c.(2)(a)(v) unchanged
Original text
Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights.
The order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order.
Current text
Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights.
The order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order.
16.c.(2)(b) unchanged
Original text
Personal nature of the order.
The order must be directed specifically to the subordinate. Violations of regulations, standing orders or directives, or failure to perform previously established duties are not punishable under this article, but may violate Article 92.
Current text
Personal nature of the order.
The order must be directed specifically to the subordinate. Violations of regulations, standing orders or directives, or failure to perform previously established duties are not punishable under this article, but may violate Article 92.
16.c.(2)(c) unchanged
Original text
Form and transmission of the order.
As long as the order is understandable, the form of the order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted to the accused.
Current text
Form and transmission of the order.
As long as the order is understandable, the form of the order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted to the accused.
16.c.(2)(d) unchanged
Original text
Specificity of the order.
The order must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. An exhortation to “obey the law” or to perform one’s military duty does not constitute an order under this article.
Current text
Specificity of the order.
The order must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. An exhortation to “obey the law” or to perform one’s military duty does not constitute an order under this article.
16.c.(2)(e) unchanged
Original text
Knowledge.
The accused must have actual knowledge of the order and of the fact that the person issuing the order was the accused’s superior commissioned officer. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Current text
Knowledge.
The accused must have actual knowledge of the order and of the fact that the person issuing the order was the accused’s superior commissioned officer. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
16.c.(2)(f) unchanged
Original text
Nature of the disobedience.
“Willful disobedience” is an intentional defiance of authority. Failure to comply with an order through heedlessness, remissness, or forgetfulness is not a violation of this article but may violate Article 92.
Current text
Nature of the disobedience.
“Willful disobedience” is an intentional defiance of authority. Failure to comply with an order through heedlessness, remissness, or forgetfulness is not a violation of this article but may violate Article 92.
16.c.(2)(g) unchanged
Original text
Time for compliance.
When an order requires immediate compliance, an accused’s declared intent not to obey and the failure to make any move to comply constitutes disobedience. Immediate compliance is required for any order that does not explicitly or implicitly indicate that delayed compliance is authorized or directed. If an order requires performance in the future, an accused’s present statement of intention to disobey the order does not constitute disobedience of that order, although carrying out that intention may.
Current text
Time for compliance.
When an order requires immediate compliance, an accused’s declared intent not to obey and the failure to make any move to comply constitutes disobedience. Immediate compliance is required for any order that does not explicitly or implicitly indicate that delayed compliance is authorized or directed. If an order requires performance in the future, an accused’s present statement of intention to disobey the order does not constitute disobedience of that order, although carrying out that intention may.
16.c.(3) unchanged
Original text
Civilians and discharged prisoners.
A discharged prisoner or other civilian subject to military law ( see Article 2) and under the command of a commissioned officer is subject to the provisions of this article.
Current text
Civilians and discharged prisoners.
A discharged prisoner or other civilian subject to military law ( see Article 2) and under the command of a commissioned officer is subject to the provisions of this article.
16.d. unchanged
Original text
Maximum punishment.
Current text
Maximum punishment.
16.d.(1) unchanged
Original text
Willfully disobeying a lawful order of superior commissioned officer in time of war.
Death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
Current text
Willfully disobeying a lawful order of superior commissioned officer in time of war.
Death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
16.d.(2) unchanged
Original text
At any other time.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.
Current text
At any other time.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.
16.e. unchanged
Original text
Sample specification.
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), having received a lawful command from __________, (his) (her) superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be (his) (her) superior commissioned officer, to __________, or words to that effect, did, (at/on board—location), on or about _____ 20 __, willfully disobey the same.
Current text
Sample specification.
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), having received a lawful command from __________, (his) (her) superior commissioned officer, then known by the said __________ to be (his) (her) superior commissioned officer, to __________, or words to that effect, did, (at/on board—location), on or about _____ 20 __, willfully disobey the same.

“Original text” is the state captured the first time a provision was edited under change tracking — i.e. the text as published in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition. Provisions edited without being “marked as changed” (typos, formatting) are not recorded here; see the recent revisions feed and the site-wide changes log.