In determining reasonable diligence for the purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, courts must conduct a four-factor analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, (1972), which includes:
(1) Length of the delay — The total period of government-accountable delay from confinement to trial. A delay of sufficient length triggers a full analysis of the remaining factors.
(2) Reasons for the delay — Whether the government had legitimate justifications, such as case complexity, worldwide military logistics, operational necessities, or the need to gather scientific evidence.
(3) Whether the accused demanded a speedy trial — Whether and when the accused asserted the right, and how the government responded.
(4) Prejudice to the accused — Assessed in light of three recognized interests: (a) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (b) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (c) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
None of these factors alone is a necessary or sufficient condition for finding a violation U.S. v. Cooley, 75 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2016). Courts look at the proceeding as a whole, remaining “mindful that we are looking at the proceeding as a whole and not mere speed.” U.S. v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Importantly, the CAAF held in U.S. v. Cooley, 75 M.J. 247 (C.A.A.F. 2016), that because Article 10 is triggered only by pretrial confinement, the prejudice prong requires something more than the mere fact of confinement itself.