U.S. v. Hurtado, 86 M.J. 431

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Confessions

1. the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the accused unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination; prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Generally

1. military judges are presumed to know and correctly apply the law absent clear evidence to the contrary

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. in this case, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that appellant's statement to law enforcement after being informed of his rights, "I mean, I would like to speak to a lawyer, but um, yeah," was an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel; appellant's statement would be understood by a reasonable law enforcement officer as a clear request for counsel and therefore constituted an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel; the intervening filler phrase "but um," followed by the affirmative "yeah," did not change that meaning; in ordinary speech, filler words such as "but um," often serve as conversational hesitations rather than signaling a retraction of the speaker's expressed intent, particularly in a stressful custodial interview; that appellant's statement included such filler words did not render his request ambiguous, especially where he both began by expressing a desire to speak with a lawyer and ended with an affirmative "yeah;" the military judge expressly cited Davis v. U.S., 512 US 452 (1994), which sets out the reasonable police officer standard, and nothing in the record overcomes the presumption that he applied the proper test

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Article 31

1. the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the accused unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination; prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Invocation of Rights

1. when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights
2. to effectively invoke the right to counsel and trigger the Miranda/Edwards protections, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel; whether a suspect has done so is an objective inquiry; thus, the suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney; once a suspect unambiguously invokes the right to counsel, authorities must immediately cease questioning; however, should that statement ultimately be ambiguous, indicating that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the cessation of questioning is not required
3. in this case, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that appellant's statement to law enforcement after being informed of his rights, "I mean, I would like to speak to a lawyer, but um, yeah," was an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel; appellant's statement would be understood by a reasonable law enforcement officer as a clear request for counsel and therefore constituted an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel; the intervening filler phrase "but um," followed by the affirmative "yeah," did not change that meaning; in ordinary speech, filler words such as "but um," often serve as conversational hesitations rather than signaling a retraction of the speaker's expressed intent, particularly in a stressful custodial interview; that appellant's statement included such filler words did not render his request ambiguous, especially where he both began by expressing a desire to speak with a lawyer and ended with an affirmative "yeah;" the military judge expressly cited Davis v. U.S., 512 US 452 (1994), which sets out the reasonable police officer standard, and nothing in the record overcomes the presumption that he applied the proper test

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Self-incrimination

1. the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the accused unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination; prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Warnings

1. the Fifth Amendment protects a person from being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the accused unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination; prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed

Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: Article 62 Appeal

1. in an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, an appellate court reviews a military judge's decision directly and reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial
2. on matters of fact with respect to appeals under Article 62, UCMJ, an appellate court is bound by the military judge's factual determinations unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous

Trial Stages: Appeals: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. in an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, the CAAF reviews a military judge's decision directly and reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial
2. on matters of fact with respect to appeals under Article 62, UCMJ, the CAAF is bound by the military judge's factual determinations unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews a military judge's ruling on the suppression of evidence for an abuse of discretion
2. on mixed questions of law and fact, an appellate court examines a military judge's findings of fact for clear error and reviews his conclusions of law de novo