U.S. v. Navarro Aguirre, 86 M.J. 43

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Duties and Responsibilities

1. a providence inquiry into a guilty plea must establish that the accused himself believes he is guilty and the factual circumstances as revealed by the accused himself objectively support that plea
2. an appellant's inability to recall specific facts underlying his or her offense does not render the guilty plea improvident; although personal awareness is not a prerequisite for a plea of guilty, an inquiry must be made to ascertain if an accused is convinced of his own guilt; such a conviction may be predicated on an accused's assessment of the government's evidence against him
3. Article 45(a), requires a guilty plea to be rejected when inconsistent matters arise that cannot be resolved; inconsistencies and apparent defenses must be resolved by the military judge or the guilty plea must be rejected
4. the possible defense standard is the threshold for a military judge to inquire into potential affirmative defenses during a guilty plea colloquy; this standard is a lower threshold than a prima facie showing because it is intended as a trigger to prompt further inquiry pursuant to Article 45, UCMJ, and Care; moreover, the possible defense standard requires that the acceptance of a guilty plea be accompanied by certain safeguards to ensure the providence of the plea, including the delineation of the elements of the offense charged and admission of factual guilt on the record are in line with Article 45, UCMJ

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Duties and Responsibilities

1. in cases where the issue of automatism has been reasonably raised by the evidence, a military judge should instruct the panel that automatism may serve to negate the actus reus of a criminal offense

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. with respect to the providence of a guilty plea, a military judge abuses his or her discretion only where there is a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning the guilty plea
2. in this case, the military judge did not abuse his discretion when he accepted appellant's guilty pleas to reckless driving where appellant admitted that he took a prescribed dose of Ambien, fell asleep in his bed, and the next thing he remembered was being behind the wheel of his car; in the face of the possibility that appellant's reckless driving was the product of automatism, the military judge reopened the Care inquiry, squarely addressed the issue of automatism, and appellant affirmatively declined to avail himself of the defense; and a reasonable inference drawn from the facts elicited during the Care inquiry was that appellant knew that taking Ambien would impair his ability to safely drive his car, and that he recognized, and culpably disregarded, the foreseeable consequences to others (i.e., putting them at risk of being physically harmed) when he drove his car in a dangerous manner after taking the medication

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Instructions

1. in cases where the issue of automatism has been reasonably raised by the evidence, a military judge should instruct the panel that automatism may serve to negate the actus reus of a criminal offense

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Crimes: Article 112a - Wrongful Use, Possession, etc., of Controlled Substances Offenses on/after 1 Jan 2019

1. in this case, appellant's conviction for wrongful use of Ambien was legally insufficient when: (1) he had a valid prescription for Ambien, and (2) the basis for his conviction was a medically-known side effect; the government could point to no direct evidence that appellant engaged in the wrongful use of Ambien and the four reasonable inferences offered by the government to affirm appellant's conviction were not enough to sustain the conviction; these proffered reasonable inferences included that appellant took the sleep medication earlier than he should have to get a full nights rest; that because an Ambien prescription label and a brown paper bag were observed in appellant's car, he must have used the Ambien while in his car rather than at home where he could be prepared to go to sleep; that because appellant was still partially in his duty uniform at the time of the police found him in his car, he must have taken the prescription before getting home and properly preparing for sleep; and that because appellant did not need to fall asleep in the early evening in order to get up in time to work a night shift, this shows that he must have been misusing the Ambien when he took it during that time frame; however, these proffered reasonable inferences were better characterized as understandable, but not compelling, suspicions, speculations, and suppositions; and such considerations that were overly speculative and too attenuated from the evidence in the record, standing alone, were not enough to sustain a conviction even under the very low threshold standard applicable during a legal sufficiency review

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Crimes: Article 113 - Drunken or Reckless Operation of a Vehicle, Aircraft, or Vessel Offenses on/after 1 Jan 2019

1. in this case, appellant's guilty plea for reckless driving was provident when he took his prescribed dose of Ambien, fell asleep in his bed, and the next thing he remembered was being behind the wheel of his car; in the face of the possibility that appellant's reckless driving was the product of automatism, the military judge reopened the Care inquiry, squarely addressed the issue of automatism, and appellant affirmatively declined to avail himself of the defense; and a reasonable inference drawn from the facts elicited during the Care inquiry was that appellant knew that taking Ambien would impair his ability to safely drive his car, and that he recognized, and culpably disregarded, the foreseeable consequences to others (i.e., putting them at risk of being physically harmed) when he drove his car in a dangerous manner after taking the medication

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Defenses: Affirmative Defenses

1. military law recognizes the affirmative defense of automatism, which is action or conduct occurring without will, purpose, or reasoned intention, behavior carried out in a state of unconsciousness or mental disassociation without full awareness, and the physical and mental state of a person, who though capable of action, is not conscious of his or her actions; an accused cannot be held criminally liable in a case where the actus reus is absent because the accused did not act voluntarily, or where the mens rea is absent because the accused did not possess the necessary state of mind when he committed the involuntary act

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Inferences

1. an inference is unreasonable if it requires the jury to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its findings a guess or mere possibility; after all, inferences must stop at some point; to this end, at some point along a rational continuum, inferences may become so attenuated from underlying evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact's ultimate conclusion

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Trial Presumptions, Inferences

1. an inference is unreasonable if it requires the jury to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its findings a guess or mere possibility; after all, inferences must stop at some point; to this end, at some point along a rational continuum, inferences may become so attenuated from underlying evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact's ultimate conclusion

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Appellate Burdens, Standards, Etc. › Presumptions

1. an appellate court does not give the government the benefit of every potential inference but rather, only those inferences reasonably and logically flowing from the other evidence adduced at trial

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Appellate Burdens, Standards, Etc. › Presumptions

1. an inference is unreasonable if it requires the jury to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its findings a guess or mere possibility; after all, inferences must stop at some point; to this end, at some point along a rational continuum, inferences may become so attenuated from underlying evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact's ultimate conclusion

Trial Stages: Merits: Pleas, generally

1. military law does not permit nolo contendere or no contest pleas , i.e., an accused's plea that while not admitting guilt, the accused will not dispute the charge

Trial Stages: Merits: Guilty Pleas

1. a providence inquiry into a guilty plea must establish that the accused himself believes he is guilty and the factual circumstances as revealed by the accused himself objectively support that plea
2. an appellant's inability to recall specific facts underlying his or her offense does not render the guilty plea improvident; although personal awareness is not a prerequisite for a plea of guilty, an inquiry must be made to ascertain if an accused is convinced of his own guilt; such a conviction may be predicated on an accused's assessment of the government's evidence against him
3. Article 45(a), requires a guilty plea to be rejected when inconsistent matters arise that cannot be resolved; inconsistencies and apparent defenses must be resolved by the military judge or the guilty plea must be rejected
4. the possible defense standard is the threshold for a military judge to inquire into potential affirmative defenses during a guilty plea colloquy; this standard is a lower threshold than a prima facie showing because it is intended as a trigger to prompt further inquiry pursuant to Article 45, UCMJ, and Care; moreover, the possible defense standard requires that the acceptance of a guilty plea be accompanied by certain safeguards to ensure the providence of the plea, including the delineation of the elements of the offense charged and admission of factual guilt on the record are in line with Article 45, UCMJ
5. guilty pleas where an accused primarily relies on the strength of the evidence against him rather than on his own independent recollections of his actions are permissible; in this regard, if an accused is personally convinced of his guilt based upon an assessment of the government's evidence, his inability to recall the specific facts underlying his offense without assistance does not preclude his guilty plea from being provident

Trial Stages: Merits: Instructions › Affirmative defenses

1. in cases where the issue of automatism has been reasonably raised by the evidence, a military judge should instruct the panel that automatism may serve to negate the actus reus of a criminal offense

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews issues of legal sufficiency de novo
2. a conviction is legally sufficient when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt; under this standard, a reviewing court must draw every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of the prosecution; the standard for legal sufficiency is a very low threshold to sustain a conviction; however, if there is no rational basis for the factfinder to draw an inference from the evidence in favor of the prosecution, and if this results in a failure of proof of an essential element, an appellate court will set aside the corresponding conviction
3. an appellate court's legal sufficiency review of a conviction is limited to the evidence that was presented to the trier of fact during the trial; although the appellate court consider all of the evidence that was admitted during the contested phase of this case (including those matters of which the military judge took judicial notice), in the course of deciding whether an appellant's conviction was legally sufficient, it may not reach beyond that evidence and look at the admissions or statements made by appellant during his guilty plea Care
4. the standard of review to be applied for legal sufficiency is a decidedly favorable one for the government; an appellate court is required to view not only the evidence, but also all the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution
5. an appellate court reviews a military judge's decision to accept a guilty plea for abuse of discretion; in reviewing the providence of a plea, a military judge abuses his or her discretion only where there is a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning the guilty plea; an appellate court gives broad discretion to military judges in accepting guilty pleas; however, the military judge's determinations of questions of law arising during or after the plea inquiry are reviewed de novo; and an appellant bears the burden of establishing that the military judge abused his discretion, i.e., that the record shows a substantial basis in law or fact to question the plea
6. in reviewing the providence inquiry for a guilty plea, an appellate court considers an appellant's colloquy with the military judge, as well as any inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it
7. in determining the providence of an appellant's guilty pleas, it is uncontroverted that an appellate court must consider the entire record in a case