U.S. v. Taylor, 86 M.J. 1

First Principles: Jurisdiction: In Personam

1. in this case, although the government asserted that the court-martial gained personal jurisdiction over appellant, a reservist, when charges were first preferred while he was on inactive-duty training and that this jurisdiction was never lost regardless of whether appellant was later properly ordered to active duty under Article 2(d), UCMJ, this argument is rejected because RCM 204(b)(1), requires that a member of a reserve component be on active duty prior to arraignment at a general or special court-martial; thus, even if court-martial jurisdiction over the offense attached upon the initial preferral of the charge and specifications, appellant still had to be on active duty at the time of his arraignment and thus any issue of whether appellant was ordered to active duty in violation of Article 2(d)(2), UCMJ, was not moot
2. Article 2(d)(1), UCMJ, authorizes a reservist to be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of trial by court-martial; however, the plain language of Article 2(d)(2), UCMJ, precludes the involuntary ordering of a reservist to active duty for the purpose of trial by court-martial for offenses that did not occur when the reservist was on active duty or performing inactive-duty training; although Congress could amend Article 2(d)(2), UCMJ, to cover intervals between two periods of inactive-duty training, the current language of the statute does not include such periods
3. the plain reading of Article 2(d), UCMJ, does not lead to a result that is so shocking to the general moral or common sense that it qualifies as absurd; Congress clearly recognized that reservists at times commit offenses on the Saturday night during the interval between their Saturday and Sunday inactive-duty training; Congress made progress in addressing this situation by amending Article 2(a)(3), UCMJ, so that reservists are subject to the UCMJ during this period; Congress, however, has not yet completely solved the problem of authorizing the calling of such reservists to active duty to stand trial; this is not an absurd result; it is just a case of legislation not yet implementing what some consider optimal policy

Trial Stages: Appeals: Preservation of Error / Plain Error

1. when conducting a plain error review of a nonconstitutional issue, an appellate court may grant relief only if the appellant proves that there was an error, that the error was clear and obvious, and that the error caused material prejudice
2. in this case where appellant was not properly ordered to active duty under Article 2(d), UCMJ, and his trial therefore violated RCM 204(b)(1), the error was not clear and obvious where it was clear and obvious that the plain language of Article 2(d), UCMJ, did not provide the government with authority to order appellant to active duty

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. when conducting a plain error review of a nonconstitutional issue, an appellate court may grant relief only if the appellant proves that there was an error, that the error was clear and obvious, and that the error caused material prejudice
2. the interpretation of UCMJ and RCM provisions and the military judge's compliance with them are questions of law, which an appellate court reviews de novo

Trial Stages: Appeals: Waiver

1. in this case, trial defense counsel's brief interjection about the convening authority's authority to order appellant to active duty, made in the middle of another sentence, was simply too ambiguous to constitute a waiver of any objection to appellant's order to active duty

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. the absurdity doctrine allows a court to depart from the plain language of a statute only in very limited circumstances; a departure from the letter of the law may be justified to avoid an absurd result if the absurdity is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense
2. an unintentional drafting gap in a statute is insufficient to warrant judicial correction; correction is the province of Congress in cases where an admittedly anomalous result may seem odd, but is not absurd