U.S. v. Valentin- Andino, 85 M.J. 361

Trial Stages: Appeals: Courts of Criminal Appeals › Sentence appropriateness

1. Article 66(d)(2) provides that a CCA may provide appropriate relief if the accused demonstrates excessive delay in the processing of the court-martial
2. the phrase "appropriate relief" is not synonymous with "meaningful relief"; applying the common definition of the term "appropriate" to the plain text of Article 66(d)(2), the phrase "appropriate relief" means that if a CCA decides to grant sentencing relief, it must merely ensure that the relief it grants is suitable under the facts and circumstances of the case; to be clear, "appropriate relief" may indeed provide an appellant with a meaningful and tangible benefit, but the language of Article 66(d)(2) does not mandate that result
3. Article 66(d)(2) is a specific provision incorporated to govern errors of excessive delay in post-trial processing; in this case, the CCA granted relief for the government's post-trial processing errors under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, or US v. Tardif (57 MJ 219 (CAAF 2002)); in doing so, the CCA erred to the extent it granted Tardif relief under Article 66(d)(1) because errors regarding post-trial delay are now solely governed by Article 66(d)(2); Tardif and its progeny have been superseded by Article 66(d)(2); however, any error was harmless because the CCA had the authority to grant "appropriate relief" under Article 66(d)(2)
4. neither Article 66(d)(2)'s plain language nor any other provision in the MCM requires that even if appropriate relief is not equated with meaningful relief, a CCA must provide an explanation for why meaningful relief was inappropriate under the circumstances; although it is within a CCA's discretion to place its reasoning about Article 66(d)(2) relief on the record, it is not required to do so

Trial Stages: Appeals: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. the scope, applicability, and meaning of Article 66(d), UCMJ, is a matter of statutory interpretation that the CAAF reviews de novo

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the scope, applicability, and meaning of Article 66(d), UCMJ, is a matter of statutory interpretation that the CAAF reviews de novo
2. the first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case; the inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent
3. whether statutory language is ambiguous is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole; and where a statute does not define a relevant phrase, a court must seek to discern its ordinary meaning through an analysis of its constituent words; when a common word or phrase in a statute lacks a unique legal meaning, a court may consult a lay dictionary in the course of defining it
4. in interpreting a statute, a court should always turn first to one cardinal canon before all others, that is, courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there; when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete
5. it is fundamental that a general statutory provision may not be used to nullify or to trump a specific provision, irrespective of the priority of enactment

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. the first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case; the inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent
2. whether statutory language is ambiguous is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole; and where a statute does not define a relevant phrase, a court must seek to discern its ordinary meaning through an analysis of its constituent words; when a common word or phrase in a statute lacks a unique legal meaning, a court may consult a lay dictionary in the course of defining it
3. in interpreting a statute, a court should always turn first to one cardinal canon before all others, that is, courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there; when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete
4. it is fundamental that a general statutory provision may not be used to nullify or to trump a specific provision, irrespective of the priority of enactment