U.S. v. Metz, 84 M.J. 421

Military Justice Personnel: Defense Function: Effective / Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. to establish ineffectiveness of counsel, an appellant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient; this requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; second, an appellant must show that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice; this requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable; an appellant must prove that defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
2. in any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances; scrutiny of counsel's performance should be highly deferential; and the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct must be assessed on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct
3. when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on counsel's failure to make a motion to suppress evidence, an appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that such a motion would have been meritorious; similarly, if deficient performance is established, to demonstrate prejudice, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome
4. where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, appellant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice
5. in this case, defense counsel's failure to move to suppress evidence arising out of an illegal apprehension of appellant was not ineffective assistance of counsel where appellant's consent to search was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal apprehension and appellant failed to carry his burden to show that there was a reasonable probability that any motion to suppress evidence due to the illegal apprehension would have succeeded

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. an appellate court reviews a military judge's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion; a military judge abuses his discretion if his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his conclusions of law are incorrect
2. in this case, the military judge's finding of fact that law enforcement agents did not believe appellant was a suspect on their initial visit to his barracks room was not clearly erroneous where the facts and circumstances did not indicate that the agents believed or reasonably should have believed appellant was a suspect; rather, the objective facts and circumstances supported the agents' testimony that they were merely conducting screening interviews; therefore, the military judge did not abuse his discretion when he concluded that an Article 31(b), UCMJ, rights warning was not required

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Generally

1. under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Article 31

1. Article 31(b), UCMJ, warnings are required when (1) a person subject to the UCMJ, (2) interrogates or requests any statement, (3) from an accused or person suspected of an offense, and (4) the statements regard the offense of which the person questioned is accused or suspected.
2. whether a person is a suspect to warrant Article 31(b), UCMJ, warnings is an objective question that is answered by considering all the facts and circumstances at the time of the interview to determine whether the military questioner believed or reasonably should have believed that the servicemember committed an offense; at times it can also be appropriate to consider the subjective view, looking at what the investigator, in fact, believed, and deciding if the investigator considered the interrogated person to be a suspect; designating someone a suspect for Article 31(b), UCMJ, purposes requires more than merely a hunch
3. in this case, the military judge's finding of fact that law enforcement agents did not believe appellant was a suspect on their initial visit to his barracks room was not clearly erroneous where the facts and circumstances did not indicate that the agents believed or reasonably should have believed appellant was a suspect; rather, the objective facts and circumstances supported the agents' testimony that they were merely conducting screening interviews; therefore, the military judge did not abuse his discretion when he concluded that an Article 31(b), UCMJ, rights warning was not required

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Apprehension/arrest

1. in this case, there was an illegal apprehension where even if law enforcement agent's initial suspicions about appellant keeping his hands in his pockets allowed for an investigatory stop, he kept appellant handcuffed beyond the time necessary to establish he was not armed and presented no physical danger, and there was no indication of any specific reasonable inferences that suggested appellant should have been handcuffed while he was led up to his room

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Consent

1. under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained; the critical inquiry is whether appellant's consent to search was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful act; an appellate court looks at whether the objected-to evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or in a manner that is sufficiently distinguishable as to cleanse it of the primary taint; whether consent to a search is valid is measured by whether the consent was freely and voluntarily given as determined by the totality of the circumstances
2. to determine whether an accused's consent was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and a constitutional violation, three factors are considered: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct; the burden of proving admissibility lies with the prosecution
3. in this case, appellant's consent to search his barracks room was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between his consent and his illegal apprehension, and thus the exclusionary rule did not apply; although there was no meaningful temporal break between the apprehension and consent, the law enforcement agents' desire to search appellant's room was not a direct result of the illegal apprehension, appellant was only illegally held for a few minutes, the illegal apprehension stemmed from the agents' overall nervousness and uncertainty about appellant's state of mind, and there was no evidence that the agents had concocted a plan to further their investigation by pressuring appellant to make admissions or consent to a search of his room; nothing in the agents' behavior or testimony indicated the level of flagrancy or purpose and intent needed to trigger the exclusionary rule; all these considerations indicate that any misconduct on the part of the agents was minor, that there was no intent or attempt to exploit the illegal apprehension, and that it was simply not the kind of behavior the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Exclusionary rule

1. exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of consent to search that followed a constitutional violation is favored only when the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence, that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant
2. in this case, appellant's consent to search his barracks room was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between his consent and his illegal apprehension, and thus the exclusionary rule did not apply; although there was no meaningful temporal break between the apprehension and consent, the law enforcement agents' desire to search appellant's room was not a direct result of the illegal apprehension, appellant was only illegally held for a few minutes, the illegal apprehension stemmed from the agents' overall nervousness and uncertainty about appellant's state of mind, and there was no evidence that the agents had concocted a plan to further their investigation by pressuring appellant to make admissions or consent to a search of his room; nothing in the agents' behavior or testimony indicated the level of flagrancy or purpose and intent needed to trigger the exclusionary rule; all these considerations indicate that any misconduct on the part of the agents was minor, that there was no intent or attempt to exploit the illegal apprehension, and that it was simply not the kind of behavior the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Stop and frisk

1. law enforcement may conduct a limited search of a person when there is reasonable fear for their own or others' safety without violating the Fourth Amendment; in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experiences

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews a military judge's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion; a military judge abuses his discretion if his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his conclusions of law are incorrect
2. when there is a motion to suppress a statement on the ground that Article 31(b), UCMJ, rights' warnings were not given, an appellate court reviews the military judge's findings of fact on a clearly erroneous standard, and it reviews conclusions of law de novo
3. reviewing for ineffectiveness of counsel, an appellate court looks at questions of deficient performance and prejudice de novo
4. under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained; the critical inquiry is whether appellant's consent to search was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful act; an appellate court looks at whether the objected-to evidence was obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality or in a manner that is sufficiently distinguishable as to cleanse it of the primary taint; whether consent to a search is valid is measured by whether the consent was freely and voluntarily given as determined by the totality of the circumstances
5. to determine whether an accused's consent was an independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and a constitutional violation, three factors are considered: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct; the burden of proving admissibility lies with the prosecution