U.S. v. Sigrah, 82 M.J. 463

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Generally

1. RCM 914 requires the government to make available to the defense, after a witness has testified, any statement possessed by the United States that the witness has made
2. the Jencks Act (18 USC 3500(b)) requires a district court judge, upon motion by the defendant, to order the government to disclose prior statements of its witnesses that are related to the subject matter of their testimony after each witness testifies on direct examination; RCM 914 tracks the language of the Jencks Act, but it also includes disclosure of prior statements by defense witnesses other than the accused; given the similarities in language and purpose between RCM 914 and the Jencks Act, Jencks Act case law of CAAF and that of the Supreme Court informs the analysis of RCM 914 issues
3. at the trial level, if the government, on motion by the accused, fails to produce a statement in the possession of the United States and made by a witness that relates to the subject matter concerning which the witness had testified, RCM 914(e) provides the military judge with two remedies: (1) order that the testimony of the witness be disregarded by the trier of fact, or (2) declare a mistrial if required in the interest of justice
4. generally an RCM 914 violation will not rise to a constitutional error
5. in this case, the military judge’s error in not striking the relevant testimony pursuant to RCM 914 had a substantial influence on the findings where (1) if the military judge had applied the correct remedy and stricken the testimonies of the victim and two witnesses, the government would have had a very weak case, (2) without these testimonies, appellant would have had a strong case, (3) the testimonies were material, and (4) the testimonies were of high quality

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Confrontation

1. RCM 914 requires the government to make available to the defense, after a witness has testified, any statement possessed by the United States that the witness has made
2. the Jencks Act (18 USC 3500(b)) requires a district court judge, upon motion by the defendant, to order the government to disclose prior statements of its witnesses that are related to the subject matter of their testimony after each witness testifies on direct examination; RCM 914 tracks the language of the Jencks Act, but it also includes disclosure of prior statements by defense witnesses other than the accused; given the similarities in language and purpose between RCM 914 and the Jencks Act, Jencks Act case law of CAAF and that of the Supreme Court informs the analysis of RCM 914 issues
3. at the trial level, if the government, on motion by the accused, fails to produce a statement in the possession of the United States and made by a witness that relates to the subject matter concerning which the witness had testified, RCM 914(e) provides the military judge with two remedies: (1) order that the testimony of the witness be disregarded by the trier of fact, or (2) declare a mistrial if required in the interest of justice
4. generally an RCM 914 violation will not rise to a constitutional error
5. in this case, the military judge’s error in not striking the relevant testimony pursuant to RCM 914 had a substantial influence on the findings where (1) if the military judge had applied the correct remedy and stricken the testimonies of the victim and two witnesses, the government would have had a very weak case, (2) without these testimonies, appellant would have had a strong case, (3) the testimonies were material, and (4) the testimonies were of high quality

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. when a military judge errs in denying an RCM 914 motion, an appellate court must determine whether this error prejudiced appellant; the test for prejudice depends on whether the defect amounts to a constitutional error or a nonconstitutional error; an appellate court’s review for prejudice is de novo
2. when there is a preserved nonconstitutional error in the application of RCM 914, an appellate court must determine if the error had a substantial influence on the findings; in conducting the prejudice analysis, the court weighs: (1) the strength of the government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question
3. in this case, the military judge’s error in not striking the relevant testimony pursuant to RCM 914 had a substantial influence on the findings where (1) if the military judge had applied the correct remedy and stricken the testimonies of the victim and two witnesses, the government would have had a very weak case, (2) without these testimonies, appellant would have had a strong case, (3) the testimonies were material, and (4) the testimonies were of high quality

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the Jencks Act (18 USC 3500(b)) requires a district court judge, upon motion by the defendant, to order the government to disclose prior statements of its witnesses that are related to the subject matter of their testimony after each witness testifies on direct examination; RCM 914 tracks the language of the Jencks Act, but it also includes disclosure of prior statements by defense witnesses other than the accused; given the similarities in language and purpose between RCM 914 and the Jencks Act, Jencks Act case law of CAAF and that of the Supreme Court informs the analysis of RCM 914 issues
2. when a military judge errs in denying an RCM 914 motion, an appellate court must determine whether this error prejudiced appellant; the test for prejudice depends on whether the defect amounts to a constitutional error or a nonconstitutional error; an appellate court’s review for prejudice is de novo
3. when there is a preserved nonconstitutional error in the application of RCM 914, an appellate court must determine if the error had a substantial influence on the findings; in conducting the prejudice analysis, the court weighs: (1) the strength of the government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question