U.S. v. Guyton, 82 M.J. 146

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Right to a Speedy Trial

1. in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial; although pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable, the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment
2. an appellate court weighs the following four factors to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused’s demand for a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused

Trial Stages: Appeals: Courts of Criminal Appeals › Generally

1. a CCA may act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority; in this case, the CCA could not approve a sentence that included forfeiture of all pay and allowances where the convening authority did not approve the forfeiture portion of appellant’s sentence

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court conducts a de novo review of speedy trial claims; however, it reviews for an abuse of discretion the decision of a military judge to grant a delay, thereby rendering that period of time excludable for speedy trial purposes
2. an appellate court weighs the following four factors to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused’s demand for a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Rule for Courts-Martial 707

1. under RCM 707, an accused must be brought to trial within 120 days after preferral of charges; for purposes of RCM 707, an accused is brought to trial at the time of arraignment; ordinarily, when an accused is not under pretrial restraint and charges are dismissed, a new 120-day time period begins on the date of repreferral; however, if charges are merely withdrawn and not subsequently dismissed, the RCM 707 speedy-trial clock continues to run
2. applying the speedy trial provisions of RCM 707 does not merely consist of calculating the passage of calendar days; the rule explicitly states that certain days shall not count for the purpose of computing time; in fact, RCM 707(c)(1) states that prior to referral, all pretrial delays approved by a military judge or the convening authority shall be excluded from the RMC 707 120-day clock; and after referral, only the military judge has the authority to approve pretrial days that are excluded from the 120-day clock; the RCM does not preclude after-the-fact approval of a delay by the military judge
3. although the discussion to RCM 707 states that the decision to grant or deny a reasonable delay is a matter within the sole discretion of a military judge based on the facts and circumstances then and there existing, an appellate court requires good cause for the delay and also requires that the length of time requested be reasonable based on the facts and circumstances of each case
4. despite the fact that 192 days elapsed in this case from the time of preferral to the time of arraignment, the government did not violate RCM 707’s speedy trial provision because the military judge did not abuse his discretion when he decided that 59 days attributable to judicial delay were excludable for speedy trial purposes and, upon accounting for those excludable delays, when he concluded that the government did not exceed the 120-day limit imposed by RCM 707; specifically, legitimate reasons existed for the delay to include docket availability, the availability of all parties, and judicial economy in combining arraignment and motions in a single hearing; under all the circumstances of the case, there was good cause for the military judge’s decision and the delay was reasonable

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

1. in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial; although pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable, the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment
2. an appellate court weighs the following four factors to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused’s demand for a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused
3. the prejudice factor used to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation should be assessed in the light of the three interests of the accused which the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired; of these forms of prejudice, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system; with regard to the second interest, this interest anticipates that an appellant will demonstrate some degree of particularized anxiety and concern greater than the normal anxiety and concern associated with the delay of his trial
4. in this case, the military judge did not err when he ruled that appellant could not prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim because he demonstrated no prejudice and the other three speedy trial factors only weighed slightly in his favor; appellant did not claim that his defense was impaired or that he was incarcerated or restricted pending trial, but rather focused on the interest he had in minimizing his anxiety and concern, stating that he experienced stress flowing from the pending charges; however, he only waited about 9 months for his trial to begin and the record showed no particularized anxiety in the record

Miscellaneous Matters: Manual for Courts-Martial: Force and Effect

1. the provisions of a discussion section to the RCM are not binding but instead serve as guidance