U.S. v. Long, 81 M.J. 362

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Generally

1. evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; this familiar standard of review gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts; in applying this test for legal sufficiency, reviewing courts must remember that findings may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence; and circumstantial evidence is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence; with both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities; if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court can require no more

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Other Acts

1. using charged conduct as propensity evidence for other charged conduct in the same case is error, regardless of the forum, the number of victims, or whether the events are connected

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Sexual Assault and Child Molestation

1. in this case, the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that appellant was guilty of raping his daughter by penetrating her vulva with his penis where (1) based on the facts that the daughter experienced pain around her vagina, detected blood there before she had begun menstruating, and reported waking up to Appellant on top of her the night before, a rational factfinder could reasonably have inferred that Appellant penetrated her vulva, and (2) based on the position of appellant’s body and his hands, a reasonable inference that can be drawn in favor of the government is that appellant penetrated her with his penis
2. in this case, although the non-propensity evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the finding of guilt that appellant raped his daughter, the use of propensity evidence from another charged offense (that appellant penetrated the mother with his penis) to prove the charged offense (that appellant penetrated his daughter with his penis) was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the non-propensity evidence was not overwhelming; although this case involved some corroborating evidence, the factfinder had to make an inference that appellant penetrated the daughter with his penis as opposed to with some other object, and in making this inference, the factfinder may have been influenced by the mother’s testimony that appellant had sexually assaulted her in the same manner as her daughter, coupled with the government’s propensity argument; the evidence supporting a conviction was simply not overwhelming without use of the propensity evidence

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. where a forfeited constitutional error is clear or obvious, material prejudice under Article 59(a), UCMJ, is assessed using the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt standard; that standard is met where a court is confident that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction
2. in this case, although the non-propensity evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the finding of guilt that appellant raped his daughter, the use of propensity evidence from another charged offense (that appellant penetrated the mother with his penis) to prove the charged offense (that appellant penetrated his daughter with his penis) was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the non-propensity evidence was not overwhelming; although this case involved some corroborating evidence, the factfinder had to make an inference that appellant penetrated the daughter with his penis as opposed to with some other object, and in making this inference, the factfinder may have been influenced by the mother’s testimony that appellant had sexually assaulted her in the same manner as her daughter, coupled with the government’s propensity argument; the evidence supporting a conviction was simply not overwhelming without use of the propensity evidence

Trial Stages: Appeals: Preservation of Error / Plain Error

1. where the accused fails to preserve a constitutional instructional error by an adequate objection or request, an appellate court tests for plain error; to establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious at the time of appeal, and (3) prejudicial

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews de novo the question of whether the evidence was legally sufficient
2. evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; this familiar standard of review gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts; in applying this test for legal sufficiency, reviewing courts must remember that findings may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence; and circumstantial evidence is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence; with both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities; if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court can require no more
3. where the accused fails to preserve a constitutional instructional error by an adequate objection or request, an appellate court tests for plain error; to establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious at the time of appeal, and (3) prejudicial
4. where a forfeited constitutional error is clear or obvious, material prejudice under Article 59(a), UCMJ, is assessed using the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt standard; that standard is met where a court is confident that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction