U.S. v. Ayala, 81 M.J. 25

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. a military judge’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; a military judge abuses his discretion when his findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law, or the military judge’s decision on the issue at hand is outside the range of choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the law

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Generally

1. the proponent of evidence has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is admissible

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Hearsay › Generally

1. as a general rule, hearsay, defined as an out of court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not admissible in courts-martial

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Prior Consistent Statements

1. MRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides an exception to hearsay for prior consistent statements made by a testifying witness if the statement is consistent with the witness’s testimony and is offered (i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying, or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground
2. Subsection (B)(ii) of the rule MRE 801(d)(1) is new as of 2016 and makes MRE 801(d)(1)(B) consistent with the federal rule; the addition of (B)(ii) to the rule did not impact statements that are admissible under (B)(i) nor did it in any way disturb CAAF’s existing case law relevant to (B)(i) the amendment creates no new law with respect to the admissibility of prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; as such, CAAF’s precedent interpreting (B)(i) continues to apply with full force
3. because prior consistent statements had already commonly been admitted for the limited purpose of rehabilitating witness credibility—the real change ushered in by the amended subsection (B)(ii) of MRE 801(d)(1) rule was that such prior consistent statements can now be admitted not just for the limited purpose of rehabilitation but as substantive evidence
4. a prior consistent statement need not be identical in every detail to the declarant’s testimony at trial; rather, the prior statement need only be for the most part consistent with respect to facts of central importance at the trial
5. prior consistent statements may be eligible for admission under either MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(i) or MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) but not both
6. statements admitted under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) must be relevant to the grounds of attack
7. for a prior consistent statement to be admissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), it must satisfy the following: (1) the declarant of the out-of-court statement must testify, (2) the declarant must be subject to cross-examination about the prior statement, (3) the statement must be consistent with the declarant’s testimony, (4) the declarant’s credibility as a witness must have been attacked on another ground other than the ones listed in MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(i), and (5) the prior consistent statement must actually be relevant to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility on the basis on which he or she was attacked; the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of articulating the relevancy link between the prior consistent statement and how it will rehabilitate the witness with respect to the particular type of impeachment that has occurred
8. a key question in considering admission under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(i) is whether the prior statements came before or after the alleged motive to fabricate; CAAF has identified two additional guiding principles that govern admission under (B)(i): (1) the prior statement, admitted as substantive evidence, must precede any motive to fabricate or improper influence that it is offered to rebut, and (2) where multiple motives to fabricate or multiple improper influences are asserted, the statement need not precede all such motives or influences, but only the one it is offered to rebut; if the statement occurred after the motive arose, then the declarant’s consistency signifies nothing
9. statements made after an improper influence arose do not rehabilitate a witness’s credibility

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. for preserved nonconstitutional evidentiary errors, the test for prejudice is whether the error had a substantial influence on the findings; in conducting the prejudice analysis, an appellate court weighs: (1) the strength of the government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question
2. in this case, whether or not the military judge erred in admitting text messages from the victim to her mother the morning after the alleged sexual assault and the victim’s videotaped interview with law enforcement as prior consistent statements under MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and MRE 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), appellant was not prejudiced by the military judge’s decision to admit the evidence where (1) the military judge redacted irrelevant portions from the text messages and required counsel for both sides to agree to redactions from the videotape that excluded irrelevant portions, (2) he did not give appellant a harsh sentence or provide any other indication he had been improperly swayed, (3) he convicted on only two of the three specifications and took care to except specific language in one of those remaining specifications, indicating he was paying close attention to the evidence he considered, (4) the government had a reasonably strong case, which included additional evidence that supported the victim’s version of events, (5) in the victim’s pretext emails with appellant, although appellant did not provide a full admission of guilt, he admitted that he knew at the very least that his conduct had been potentially unlawful, (6) appellant mentioned to another soldier that he may have made a mistake with victim, (7) the victim was an overall credible witness, (8) the defense case was not as strong, and (9) the text messages and videotape interview as admitted were not significant evidence because both repeated evidence that had come in through the victim’s testimony and therefore would already have been considered by the military judge

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a military judge’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; a military judge abuses his discretion when his findings of fact are clearly erroneous, the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law, or the military judge’s decision on the issue at hand is outside the range of choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the law
2. for preserved nonconstitutional evidentiary errors, the test for prejudice is whether the error had a substantial influence on the findings; in conducting the prejudice analysis, an appellate court weighs: (1) the strength of the government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question