CAAF Opinion Digest · one opinion, every topic
U.S. v. Harrington, 81 M.J. 184
Decided May 6, 2021 · No. 21-0025/AF · October 2020 Term · Opinion (PDF)
Digested under 5 topics
First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Right to a Speedy Trial
- in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: Article 62 Appeal
- in an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, an appellate court reviews the military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial
Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.
- an appellate court reviews the decision of whether an accused has received a speedy trial de novo as a legal question, giving substantial deference to a military judge’s findings of fact that will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous; a finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the finding or when although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed
- an appellate court determines whether an appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial using the four‑factor test that the Supreme Court established in Barker v. Wingo (407 US 514 (1972)): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the appellant
- in the prejudice analysis of the four-factor speedy trial test, there are three interests that an appellate court considers: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal, and his defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired
- the most serious interest in analyzing the prejudice factor of the four-factor speedy trial test is evaluating the ability of an appellant to assert his or her defense in the event of a retrial or resentencing; this form of prejudice is the most serious because it skews the fairness of the entire system
Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Generally
- an appellate court reviews the decision of whether an accused has received a speedy trial de novo as a legal question, giving substantial deference to a military judge’s findings of fact that will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous; a finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the finding or when although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed
- in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
- an appellate court determines whether an appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial using the four‑factor test that the Supreme Court established in Barker v. Wingo (407 US 514 (1972)): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the appellant
- in the prejudice analysis of the four-factor speedy trial test, there are three interests that an appellate court considers: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal, and his defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired
- the most serious interest in analyzing the prejudice factor of the four-factor speedy trial test is evaluating the ability of an appellant to assert his or her defense in the event of a retrial or resentencing; this form of prejudice is the most serious because it skews the fairness of the entire system
- in this case, the military judge did not err when he granted appellant’s motion to dismiss due to a speedy trial violation where (1) there was a delay of over 400 days in retrying appellant, which was particularly unreasonable when the retrial was to consist of the rehearing of a single specification and the sole victim chose to participate again; (2) the government was the primary cause of the delay; (3) appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) appellant was prejudiced by the delay in his case given that witnesses had lost their memories of the events during the delay and this memory loss negatively affected appellant’s defense when substitute testimony could not suffice
Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
- in military prosecutions, the accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial protections are generally triggered when charges are preferred
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