U.S. v. Lewis, 78 M.J. 447

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: General Powers

1. a military judge is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. a military judge’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
2. a military judge abuses his discretion if his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his conclusions of law are incorrect; the abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that a judge has a range of choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within that range
3. in this case, where an initial confession was involuntary only because the accused had not been properly warned of his Article 31(b), UCMJ, rights to silence and to counsel, the military judge clearly erred in finding that a later, warned confession was involuntary where the judge presumed that that accused was suffering from a psychological adjustment disorder that affected his mood and ability to deal with additional stressors at the time of his later confession, when in fact, there was no evidence that the accused suffered from the disorder at the time of that confession, and this erroneous finding played no small role in his ultimate determination of voluntariness; even assuming that the accused had suffered from adjustment disorder at the time of his later confession, mental illness does not make a statement involuntary per se; here, the record did not reflect that the accused’s adjustment disorder negatively affected his capacity for free choice or that government overreaching occurred at the time of his later confession, and on the whole, the accused’s characteristics favored a finding of voluntariness; furthermore, the later confession was voluntary considering all the facts and circumstances, where (1) the accused chose to speak after being informed of his rights, (2) the interrogator was not one who had interrogated the accused previously, (3) the questioning was not particularly lengthy, (4) there were no threats, lies, or physical abuse, and the accused was not denied any material comforts, (5) the accused’s confession came almost two full months after his first unwarned interrogation, during which time he was not confined, and (6) the accused had been warned of his right to counsel during the previous interrogations and had several weeks between interviews to seek legal counsel or decide to decline further interviews and he did not do so; because the military judge clearly erred in his factfinding and rationale, and because the accused’s confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, the military judge abused his discretion in suppressing the later confession

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Generally

1. a military judge’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
2. a military judge is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Generally

1. a cleansing statement advises a suspect that the contents of previous unwarned statements may not be used against him

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Voluntariness

1. MRE 304(a) provides that an involuntary statement from the accused, or any evidence derived therefrom, is inadmissible at trial; a confession is involuntary if it was obtained in violation of the self-incrimination privilege or Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 31, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement
2. the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary; voluntariness turns on whether an accused’s will has been overborne; the necessary inquiry is whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker
3. where a confession is obtained at a lawful interrogation that comes after an earlier interrogation in which a confession was obtained due to actual coercion, duress, or inducement, the subsequent confession is presumptively tainted as the product of the earlier one
4. where the earlier confession was involuntary only because the suspect had not been properly warned of his panoply of rights to silence and to counsel, the voluntariness of the second confession is determined by the totality of the circumstances
5. in determining whether an accused’s will was overborne in a particular case, the totality of all the surrounding circumstances are considered, to include both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation; some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, an earlier violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, whether the admission was made as a result of the questioner’s using earlier, unlawful interrogations, and the presence of a cleansing warning, although the absence of such is not fatal to a finding of voluntariness; the fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights, is of course, highly probative
6. mental illness does not make a statement involuntary per se
7. in this case, where an initial confession was involuntary only because the accused had not been properly warned of his Article 31(b), UCMJ, rights to silence and to counsel, the military judge clearly erred in finding that a later, warned confession was involuntary where the judge presumed that that accused was suffering from a psychological adjustment disorder that affected his mood and ability to deal with additional stressors at the time of his later confession, when in fact, there was no evidence that the accused suffered from the disorder at the time of that confession, and this erroneous finding played no small role in his ultimate determination of voluntariness; even assuming that the accused had suffered from adjustment disorder at the time of his later confession, mental illness does not make a statement involuntary per se; here, the record did not reflect that the accused’s adjustment disorder negatively affected his capacity for free choice or that government overreaching occurred at the time of his later confession, and on the whole, the accused’s characteristics favored a finding of voluntariness; furthermore, the later confession was voluntary considering all the facts and circumstances, where (1) the accused chose to speak after being informed of his rights, (2) the interrogator was not one who had interrogated the accused previously, (3) the questioning was not particularly lengthy, (4) there were no threats, lies, or physical abuse, and the accused was not denied any material comforts, (5) the accused’s confession came almost two full months after his first unwarned interrogation, during which time he was not confined, and (6) the accused had been warned of his right to counsel during the previous interrogations and had several weeks between interviews to seek legal counsel or decide to decline further interviews and he did not do so; because the military judge clearly erred in his factfinding and rationale, and because the accused’s confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, the military judge abused his discretion in suppressing the later confession

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Inferences

1. a military judge is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Trial Burdens, Standards › Confessions and admissions

1. the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary; voluntariness turns on whether an accused’s will has been overborne; the necessary inquiry is whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker
2. in determining whether an accused’s will was overborne in a particular case, the totality of all the surrounding circumstances are considered, to include both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation; some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, an earlier violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, whether the admission was made as a result of the questioner’s using earlier, unlawful interrogations, and the presence of a cleansing warning, although the absence of such is not fatal to a finding of voluntariness; the fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights, is of course, highly probative

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Trial Presumptions, Inferences

1. a military judge is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Appellate Burdens, Standards, Etc. › Admission/suppression of evidence

1. a military judge’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; a military judge abuses his discretion if his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his conclusions of law are incorrect; the abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that a judge has a range of choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within that range
2. in determining whether an accused’s will was overborne in a particular case, the totality of all the surrounding circumstances are considered, to include both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation; some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, an earlier violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, whether the admission was made as a result of the questioner’s using earlier, unlawful interrogations, and the presence of a cleansing warning, although the absence of such is not fatal to a finding of voluntariness; the fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights, is of course, highly probative

Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: Article 62 Appeal

1. cases appealed under Article 62, UCMJ, may be reviewed under Article 67(a), UCMJ
2. in an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal, an appellate court reviews the military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a military judge’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
2. a military judge abuses his discretion if his findings of fact are clearly erroneous or his conclusions of law are incorrect; the abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that a judge has a range of choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within that range
3. the voluntariness of a confession is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo
4. the prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary; voluntariness turns on whether an accused’s will has been overborne; the necessary inquiry is whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker
5. in determining whether an accused’s will was overborne in a particular case, the totality of all the surrounding circumstances are considered, to include both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation; some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, an earlier violation of Article 31(b), UCMJ, whether the admission was made as a result of the questioner’s using earlier, unlawful interrogations, and the presence of a cleansing warning, although the absence of such is not fatal to a finding of voluntariness; the fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights, is of course, highly probative