U.S. v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Crimes: Article 130 - Housebreaking Pre-2019 offenses

1. housebreaking requires, inter alia, unlawful entry into a building or structure; a motor pool without walls or a roof, whether fenced or not, is obviously not a building; in addition, a fenced motor pool is not a structure for the purposes of Article 130, UCMJ
2. Article 130, UCMJ, provides that any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of housebreaking; according to the President’s explanation in the MCM, structure refers only to those structures in the nature of a building or dwelling
3. a fenced motor pool is not a structure subject to housebreaking; both the commonsense meaning of “structure” within a housebreaking offense and the limiting language of the MCM leave no doubt that an open-air fenced area does not fall within the scope of Article 130, UCMJ, because it is not a structure in the nature of a building or dwelling ,
4. the President’s clarification of the terms “building” and “structure” in the MCM provides a nonexclusive list of examples of buildings and structures which are in the nature of a building or dwelling; under the canon ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumerated list suggests that any structure in the nature of a building or dwelling must fit within the sort of examples listed in the President’s explanation; and the enumerated areas are all enclosed spaces that serve the same purpose as a building or dwelling, even if some are moveable or temporary rather than fixed and permanent; accordingly, the meaning of a “structure” for the purposes of Article 130, UCMJ, is a more or less permanent constructed edifice, built up of parts purposefully joined together, more or less completely enclosed by walls and covering a space of land, or a building or construction intended to be or used for residence; the fenced motor pool at issue here did not fit within this description, even if the bays within it would; it is a concrete pad surrounded by a fence; the fences are not joined together such that they resemble the enclosure of a building, nor are they joined by a roof; neither are they a permanent structure, as the fences can be easily moved or removed, unlike a motor pool bay; nor is there any evidence in the record that the motor pool was either intended or suited to be a locale or venue where persons would take up residence; the mere presence of a fence cannot transform an outdoor area into a structure in the nature of either a building or a dwelling
5. the fenced motor pool in this case is not a “structure” or a “dwelling” as contemplated by Article 130, UCMJ, because it is not an enclosed space in the same way that a building is and is not a place where persons would take up residence; to the extent that US v. Wickersham, 14 MJ 404 (CMA 1983) is inconsistent with this holding, it is overruled

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews questions of legal sufficiency de novo; when reviewing for legal sufficiency, it considers whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
2. an appellate court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo
3. it is axiomatic that in determining the scope of a statute, an appellate court looks first to its language
4. the President has the power to prescribe regulations for trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under the UCMJ; however, this power does not extend to Part IV of the MCM, and an appellate court is not bound by the President’s interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses; still, when the President’s narrowing construction of a statute does not contradict the express language of a statute, it is entitled to some deference, and an appellate court will not normally disturb that construction

Miscellaneous Matters: Manual for Courts-Martial: Generally

1. the President has the power to prescribe regulations for trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under the UCMJ; however, this power does not extend to Part IV of the MCM, and an appellate court is not bound by the President’s interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses; still, when the President’s narrowing construction of a statute does not contradict the express language of a statute, it is entitled to some deference, and an appellate court will not normally disturb that construction

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. an appellate court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo
2. it is axiomatic that in determining the scope of a statute, an appellate court looks first to its language
3. the President has the power to prescribe regulations for trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under the UCMJ; however, this power does not extend to Part IV of the MCM, and an appellate court is not bound by the President’s interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses; still, when the President’s narrowing construction of a statute does not contradict the express language of a statute, it is entitled to some deference, and an appellate court will not normally disturb that construction