U.S. v. Hendrix, 76 M.J. 283

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. in this case, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant’s request to have an expert consultant in the field of audio forensic science and voice identification where he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating necessity; appellant did receive some assistance from the requested expert when he testified at an Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing about deficiencies in the government’s voice-identification procedure, and he had other scholarly resources available to assist him in defending against the voice-identification evidence
2. in this case, the military judge did abuse his discretion when he admitted into evidence, over defense objection, the results of a voice-lineup where the alleged sexual assault victim purportedly identified appellant as her assailant; the voice-lineup evidence had no probative value as to whether the sexual assault actually occurred, or if the sexual assault did occur, whether appellant was the person who perpetrated that assault; furthermore, the lineup was not conducted in a manner that would assist the trier of fact in deciding whether or not appellant perpetrated the reported sexual assault where the methodology used was not reliable; finally, even if the voice-identification evidence had some minimal probative value, it was inadmissible under MRE 403 because this minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the misimpression it left on the members about the usefulness and importance of the voice identification

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Relevance

1. evidence that has no probative value is not relevant and is therefore inadmissible at trial

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Bodily views and intrusions

1. in this case, the military judge did abuse his discretion when he admitted into evidence, over defense objection, the results of a voice-lineup where the alleged sexual assault victim purportedly identified appellant as her assailant; the voice-lineup evidence had no probative value as to whether the sexual assault actually occurred, or if the sexual assault did occur, whether appellant was the person who perpetrated that assault; furthermore, the lineup was not conducted in a manner that would assist the trier of fact in deciding whether or not appellant perpetrated the reported sexual assault where the methodology used was not reliable; finally, even if the voice-identification evidence had some minimal probative value, it was inadmissible under MRE 403 because this minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the misimpression it left on the members about the usefulness and importance of the voice identification

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Experts

1. an accused is entitled to an expert’s assistance before trial to aid in the preparation of his defense upon a demonstration of necessity; to establish necessity, an accused must demonstrate something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert; instead, the accused must establish a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be of assistance to the defense, and (2) the denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial; to establish that an expert would be of assistance, the accused must show (1) why the expert assistance is needed, (2) what the expert assistance would accomplish for the accused, and (3) why the defense counsel were unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert assistance would be able to develop
2. in this case, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant’s request to have an expert consultant in the field of audio forensic science and voice identification where he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating necessity; appellant did receive some assistance from the requested expert when he testified at an Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing about deficiencies in the government’s voice-identification procedure, and he had other scholarly resources available to assist him in defending against the voice-identification evidence

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Burdens, Standards, Presumptions, Inferences: Trial Burdens, Standards › Appointment of experts

1. an accused is entitled to an expert’s assistance before trial to aid in the preparation of his defense upon a demonstration of necessity; to establish necessity, an accused must demonstrate something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested expert; instead, the accused must establish a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be of assistance to the defense, and (2) the denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial; to establish that an expert would be of assistance, the accused must show (1) why the expert assistance is needed, (2) what the expert assistance would accomplish for the accused, and (3) why the defense counsel were unable to gather and present the evidence that the expert assistance would be able to develop

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. the erroneous admission of evidence is prejudicial when it has a substantial influence on the members’ findings; an appellate court evaluates prejudice from an erroneous evidentiary ruling by weighing (1) the strength of the government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in question
2. in this case, the admission of the voice-identification evidence substantially influenced the members’ findings and thus had a prejudicial effect where it had no probative value and only served to bolster the alleged victim’s testimony in an otherwise weak case

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews a military judge’s decision denying a request for an expert consultant for an abuse of discretion; it also reviews a military judge’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion; this abuse of discretion standard is a strict one, calling for more than a mere difference of opinion; the challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous; where a military judge provides no explanation for his decision to deny an expert consultant or to admit evidence, the judge’s decision is entitled to less deference