U.S. v. Wilder, 75 M.J. 135

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the conclusion whether an accused received a speedy trial is a legal question that is reviewed de novo

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Generally

1. RCM 707, Article 10, UCMJ, and the Sixth Amendment provide a cohesive and sometimes overlapping framework for the protection of an accused’s speedy trial rights
2. the speedy trial protections and inquiries of RCM 707, Article 10, UCMJ, and the Sixth Amendment, though overlapping in some respects, are distinct; the fact that a prosecution meets the 120-day rule of RCM 707 does not directly or indirectly demonstrate that the government moved to trial with reasonable diligence as required by Article 10; similarly, the government might move with all reasonable diligence for purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, but nonetheless violate the bright-line 120-day rule of RCM 707

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Rule for Courts-Martial 707

1. when assessing a speedy trial violation alleged under RCM 707, the speedy trial clock commences only when one of the events listed in RCM 707(a) — preferral of charges, imposition of restraint, or entry of a reservist on active duty for purposes of court-martial — takes place
2. arraignment stops the speedy trial clock for purposes of RCM 707
3. RCM 707(b)(2) provides that when charges are preferred at different times, speedy trial accountability for each charge shall be determined from the appropriate date under RCM 707(a) for that charge; if an appellant is arraigned within 120 days after the earlier of, inter alia, the preferral of, or restraint based upon, a particular charge, then RCM 707 is not violated
4. the government might move with all reasonable diligence for purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, but nonetheless violate the bright-line 120-day rule of RCM 707
5. for purposes of a speedy trial violation alleged under RCM 707, the time is calculated by reference to the specific triggers listed in RCM 707(a) and not by reference to some other standard such as the “substantial information” rule originated in United States v. Johnson, 23 CMA 91, 48 CMR 599 (1974)(holding that delay for purposes of Article 10, UCMJ, should be measured from the time the government possessed substantial information relating to the offense); based on the plain language of RCM 707, when analyzing a speedy trial violation under RCM 707, it is the earliest of the actions listed in RCM 707(a) with respect to a particular charge that starts the speedy trial clock for that charge; RCM 707, promulgated in 1984, was a new and different layer of protection against speedy trial violations, and for violations alleged under its rubric, its plain language controls
6. in this case, there was no RCM 707 violation where the trigger dates from which to measure an alleged violation of RCM 707 were the dates of preferral, and less than 120 days passed between preferral and arraignment with respect to the charges in question

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Article 10

1. Article 10, UCMJ, requires reasonable diligence in bringing charges to trial when an accused is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial
2. trial stops the speedy trial clock for Article 10, UCMJ
3. the fact that a prosecution meets the 120-day rule of RCM 707 does not directly or indirectly demonstrate that the government moved to trial with reasonable diligence as required by Article 10

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

1. an analysis under the Sixth Amendment focuses on the date of either preferral or the imposition of restraint or confinement, and analyzes an alleged violation based on the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 530 (1972)
2. trial stops the speedy trial clock for the Sixth Amendment