U.S. v. Wilson, 72 M.J. 347

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Right to a Speedy Trial

1. the constitutional right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right; it is protected both by the Sixth Amendment and Article 10

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews de novo the question of whether an accused was denied his right to a speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ, as a matter of law; however, it is bound by the facts as found by the military judge unless those facts are clearly erroneous
2. the standard of diligence under which an appellate court reviews claims of a denial of speedy trial under Article 10 is not constant motion, but reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial; short periods of inactivity are not fatal to an otherwise active prosecution
3. an appellate court’s framework to determine for Article 10 purposes whether the government proceeded with reasonable diligence in bringing an accused to trial includes balancing the four Barker v. Wingo (407 US 514, 530 (1972)) factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to appellant; none of the four factors has any talismanic power; rather, a court must weigh all the factors collectively before deciding whether appellant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Generally

1. an accused’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether he was deprived of the right

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Article 10

1. Article 10, UCMJ, ensures a servicemember’s right to a speedy trial by providing that upon arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the charges and release him
2. the constitutional right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right; it is protected both by the Sixth Amendment and Article 10
3. Article 10 imposes on the government a more stringent speedy-trial standard than that of the Sixth Amendment; and it plays a significant role when servicemembers are confined prior to trial
4. the standard of diligence under which an appellate court reviews claims of a denial of speedy trial under Article 10 is not constant motion, but reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial; short periods of inactivity are not fatal to an otherwise active prosecution
5. an appellate court’s framework to determine for Article 10 purposes whether the government proceeded with reasonable diligence in bringing an accused to trial includes balancing the four Barker v. Wingo (407 US 514, 530 (1972)) factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to appellant; none of the four factors has any talismanic power; rather, a court must weigh all the factors collectively before deciding whether appellant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated
6. the length-of-delay factor under the Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis is to some extent a triggering mechanism, and unless there is a period of delay that appears, on its face, to be unreasonable under the circumstances, there is no necessity for inquiry into the factors that go into the balance
7. a delay of 174 days between the date the accused was placed in pretrial confinement to the date of trial was sufficient to trigger the full Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis
8. delays attributable to an accused do not weigh in favor of a Sixth Amendment violation
9. with respect to the reasons-for-the-delay factor under Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis, as a general matter, factors such as staffing issues, responsibilities for other cases, and coordination with civilian officials reflect the realities of military criminal practice that typically can be addressed by adequate attention and supervision, consistent with the government’s Article 10 responsibilities; however, there are occasions when mission requirements may make it impossible to process cases as expeditiously as one might ideally wish
10. the government is tasked with handling cases with reasonable diligence for Article 10 speedy trial purposes
11. an accused’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether he was deprived of the right
12. an accused’s speedy trial demand, made after he was subject to 114 days of pretrial confinement, only slightly favored the defense in determining whether the accused’s Article 10 right to a speedy trial was violated, where the motion was made 14 days after the accused’s motion to plead guilty was denied
13. the prejudice factor under the Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis should be assessed in the light of the interests of an accused that the speedy trial right was designed to protect; these interests are: (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired; of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of an accused adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system
14. alleged conditions of a racially tense environment with respect to an accused’s pretrial confinement in a civilian prison did not constitute oppressive pretrial confinement for purposes of the prejudice factor under the Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis where the accused did not file an Article 13 motion concerning his treatment and the record does not reflect that he complained to his chain of command; failure to raise an Article 13 claim, though not dispositive of an Article 10 claim, may be considered as a relevant factor bearing upon the question of prejudice for oppressive confinement
15. generalized and conclusory references to the anxiety and distress that are intrinsic to incarceration are not sufficient to demonstrate particularized prejudice under the Barker v. Wingo Article 10 analysis
16. delay of 115 days attributable to the government prior to an accused’s trial did not violate his Article 10 speedy trial right where, although there were several periods of unexplained or unjustified delay, those delays appeared to be the result of inattention and neglect, and although they weigh against the government, they did not weigh as heavily against the government as they would if there was a deliberate effort to delay the case; in addition, the accused waited until he had been confined for 119 days to demand a speedy trial, and he failed to establish that the conditions of his confinement or any anxiety or concern that he suffered rose to the level of Article 10 prejudice

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

1. delays attributable to an accused do not weigh in favor of a Sixth Amendment violation
2. an accused’s assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether he was deprived of the right