U.S. v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Right to Counsel

1. a waiver of an accused’s Fifth Amendment and Article 31, UCMJ, rights to counsel must be knowing and intelligent, and not merely voluntary
2. an accused’s statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights
3. in the military system the accused’s right to counsel, and the requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver, are not limited to custodial interrogation; military officials and civilians acting on their behalf are required to provide rights warnings prior to interrogating a member of the armed forces if that servicemember is a suspect, irrespective of custody
4. voluntariness of consent and knowing waiver of an accused’s right to counsel are two distinct and discrete inquiries; in addition to showing that the waiver was voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, the government must also demonstrate that the accused understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it
5. the accused has to have full awareness of both the nature of the right to counsel being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it; however, the Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege; in other words, the accused must fully understand the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in generalin the circumstances, even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it; the analysis should take into account the accused’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and his capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights; and the government must show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence
6. there are two branches to the waiver of the right to counsel analysis; first, was the waiver voluntary; and, second, was the waiver knowing and intelligent
7. whether an accused’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent is a conclusion of law rather than a conclusory finding of fact

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. on a motion to suppress an accused’s statements to investigators, alleging that the statements were involuntary because he was mentally ill at the time, a military judge abused his discretion by admitting the accused’s statement without first contextually analyzing whether he could and did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, and instead focusing solely on the question of voluntariness; the military judge also erred when he addressed whether the accused’s waiver was knowing and intelligent solely as a conclusory finding of fact, rather than as a conclusion of law

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Instructions

1. a military judge did not err in providing an objective standard for wrongfulness in his instructions to the members regarding the affirmative defense of lack of mental responsibility

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Defenses: Lack of Mental Responsibility

1. the affirmative defense of lack of mental responsibility requires the accused to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that at the time of the offense, (1) the accused suffered from a severe mental disease or defect, and (2) as a result of that mental disease or defect, the accused was unable to appreciate either (a) the nature and quality of his acts, or (b) the wrongfulness of his acts
2. the defense of mental responsibility turns on the accused’s ability to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his actions; thus, while wrongfulness is determined objectively, the determination of the accused’s ability to appreciate that wrongfulness is necessarily specific to that accused
3. within the meaning of the defense of lack of mental responsibility, an accused’s appreciation of the wrongfulness of his acts is subjective; appreciating wrongfulness is the accused’s ability to understand and grasp that his conduct violates society’s essential rules, and is supported by an accused’s understanding that his conduct violated the law, and is contradicted by evidence that, if the facts of the accused’s delusions were true, then his conduct would not violate the law
4. an objective standard for determining wrongfulness is used in the context of Article 50a, UCMJ; wrongfulness is judged by societal standards, rather than the accused’s own personal moral code, and that the standard focuses on the accused’s ability to appreciate that his conduct would be contrary to public or societal standards
5. a military judge did not err in providing an objective standard for wrongfulness in his instructions to the members regarding the affirmative defense of lack of mental responsibility

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Article 31

1. a waiver of an accused’s Fifth Amendment and Article 31, UCMJ, rights to counsel must be knowing and intelligent, and not merely voluntary
2. an accused’s statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights
3. in the military system the accused’s right to counsel, and the requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver, are not limited to custodial interrogation; military officials and civilians acting on their behalf are required to provide rights warnings prior to interrogating a member of the armed forces if that servicemember is a suspect, irrespective of custody
4. voluntariness of consent and knowing waiver of an accused’s right to counsel are two distinct and discrete inquiries; in addition to showing that the waiver was voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, the government must also demonstrate that the accused understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it
5. the accused has to have full awareness of both the nature of the right to counsel being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it; however, the Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege; in other words, the accused must fully understand the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in generalin the circumstances, even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it; the analysis should take into account the accused’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and his capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights; and the government must show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence
6. there are two branches to the waiver of the right to counsel analysis; first, was the waiver voluntary; and, second, was the waiver knowing and intelligent
7. whether an accused’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent is a conclusion of law rather than a conclusory finding of fact

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Motions to suppress

1. on a motion to suppress an accused’s statements to investigators, alleging that the statements were involuntary because he was mentally ill at the time, a military judge abused his discretion by admitting the accused’s statement without first contextually analyzing whether he could and did knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, and instead focusing solely on the question of voluntariness; the military judge also erred when he addressed whether an accused’s waiver was knowing and intelligent solely as a conclusory finding of fact, rather than as a conclusion of law

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Confessions and Admissions › Voluntariness

1. mental illness does not make a statement involuntary per se; voluntariness depends on the absence of police overreaching; regardless of the accused’s mental state, a confession will not be suppressed for involuntariness absent coercive police activity

Trial Stages: Merits: Instructions › Affirmative defenses

1. a military judge did not err in providing an objective standard for wrongfulness in his instructions to the members regarding the affirmative defense of lack of mental responsibility

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. constitutional errors are reviewed by an appellate court for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; constitutional error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction; this determination is made on the basis of the entire record, and its resolution will vary depending on the facts and particulars of the individual case; erroneous admission of a confession requires an appellate court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless
2. in a prosecution for attempted premeditated murder, in which appellant raised the affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the improper admission of appellant’s statement interrogation obtained in violation of his right to counsel was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to its potential effect on appellant’s defense, where the government relied on appellant’s statement to show that appellant, though severely mentally ill, appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions, and where trial counsel used appellant’s statement extensively in his closing argument to support the theory that appellant intended to kill his victim out of revenge, not self-defense

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. whether a panel was properly instructed is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo
2. an appellate court reviews a military judge’s decision to deny a motion to suppress evidence, like other decisions to admit or exclude evidence, for an abuse of discretion; an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous or if the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the law; the abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that a judge has a range of choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within that range; in certain cases, even when the evidence in the record may well have supported the military judge’s decision, the military judge may nonetheless have abused his discretion where the military judge’s ruling was based on a misapprehension of the applicable law and the military judge’s findings failed to address the relevant considerations
3. constitutional errors are reviewed by an appellate court for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt; constitutional error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction; this determination is made on the basis of the entire record, and its resolution will vary depending on the facts and particulars of the individual case; erroneous admission of a confession requires an appellate court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless