U.S. v. Coleman, 72 M.J. 184

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Due Process

1. the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution
2. the failure of the trial counsel to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or sentencing violates an accused’s constitutional right to due process; an appellate court reviews all such cases for harmless error - whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different
3. a military accused has the right to obtain favorable evidence under Article 46, UCMJ, as implemented by RCM 701–703; Article 46 and its implementing rules provide greater statutory discovery rights to an accused than does his constitutional right to due process

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Duties and Responsibilities

1. a military judge has discretion to declare a mistrial when such action is manifestly necessary in the interest of justice because of circumstances arising during the proceedings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the proceedings

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Discretion

1. a military judge has discretion to declare a mistrial when such action is manifestly necessary in the interest of justice because of circumstances arising during the proceedings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the proceedings
2. the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defense’s motion for mistrial where the government failed to disclose to the defense that the SJA had verbally agreed to reduce a co-accused’s sentence in exchange for his testimony against the accused because the disclosure error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the co-accused’s direct testimony was very brief and corroborated the victim’s testimony; the co-accused also testified for the defense and admitted that appellant had had consensual sexual relations with the victim earlier in the evening and that the victim was not so intoxicated that she could not walk, talk, or unlock her door without stumbling or fumbling; furthermore, the defense knew that the co-accused had been convicted and sentenced for the same offenses with which appellant was charged, and he could have impeached the co-accused with the conviction and punishment but chose not to do so; instead the defense counsel argued that the co-accused was testifying because he wanted clemency from the convening authority for his participation in the offenses; in addition, the co-accused’s motive to misrepresent was self-evident to the court members; in fact, it is unclear how knowing that the SJA had agreed to recommend that the convening authority grant the co-accused clemency in exchange for his testimony would have caused the defense counsel to change strategy or tactics or led to a different result; it would not have affected either the defense counsel’s ability to cross-examine the co-accused or his closing argument; finally, had the defense tried to impeach the co-accused with the agreement, the co-accused’s prior statement to law enforcement that was consistent with his testimony at trial would have been admitted to rebut any defense contention that he had a motive to alter his testimony to obtain clemency; even if the military judge would have refused to admit the prior consistent statement for the truth of the matter asserted, it still would have been admissible simply to corroborate, or rehabilitate, the in-court testimony of a witness, regardless of whether it qualified for exception from the hearsay rule under MRE 801(d)(1)(B); while the conduct of the prosecution in not disclosing the oral agreement between the co-accused and the SJA was, at a minimum, negligent, and certainly violated Brady, Article 46, and RCM 701–703, the government established that under the circumstances of this case, its failure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt - disclosure would not have affected the outcome of the trial, and the military judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Generally

1. a military accused has the right to obtain favorable evidence under Article 46, UCMJ, as implemented by RCM 701–703; Article 46 and its implementing rules provide greater statutory discovery rights to an accused than does his constitutional right to due process

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Prior Consistent Statements

1. a prior consistent statement is not hearsay if it is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; the rule requires that a prior statement, admitted as substantive evidence, precede any motive to fabricate or improper influence that it is offered to rebut; where multiple motives to fabricate or multiple improper influences are asserted, the statement need not precede all such motives or inferences, but only the one it is offered to rebut

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Suppression

1. the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution
2. the failure of the trial counsel to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or sentencing violates an accused’s constitutional right to due process; an appellate court reviews all such cases for harmless error - whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different

Trial Stages: Pretrial: Discovery

1. the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution
2. the failure of the trial counsel to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or sentencing violates an accused’s constitutional right to due process; an appellate court reviews all such cases for harmless error - whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different
3. a military accused has the right to obtain favorable evidence under Article 46, UCMJ, as implemented by RCM 701–703; Article 46 and its implementing rules provide greater statutory discovery rights to an accused than does his constitutional right to due process
4. there are two categories of disclosure error: (1) cases in which the defense either did not make a discovery request or made only a general request for discovery; and (2) cases in which the defense made a specific request for the undisclosed information; for cases in the first category, an appellate court applies the harmless error standard; and for cases in the second category, an appellate court applies the heightened constitutional harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard; failing to disclose requested material favorable to the defense is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the undisclosed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial

Trial Stages: Merits: Mistrial

1. a military judge has discretion to declare a mistrial when such action is manifestly necessary in the interest of justice because of circumstances arising during the proceedings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the proceedings

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. an appellate court reviews all cases in which the trial counsel failed to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or sentencing for harmless error - whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different
2. there are two categories of disclosure error: (1) cases in which the defense either did not make a discovery request or made only a general request for discovery; and (2) cases in which the defense made a specific request for the undisclosed information; for cases in the first category, an appellate court applies the harmless error standard; and for cases in the second category, an appellate court applies the heightened constitutional harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard; failing to disclose requested material favorable to the defense is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the undisclosed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial
3. the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defense’s motion for mistrial where the government failed to disclose to the defense that the SJA had verbally agreed to reduce a co-accused’s sentence in exchange for his testimony against the accused because the disclosure error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the co-accused’s direct testimony was very brief and corroborated the victim’s testimony; the co-accused also testified for the defense and admitted that appellant had had consensual sexual relations with the victim earlier in the evening and that the victim was not so intoxicated that she could not walk, talk, or unlock her door without stumbling or fumbling; furthermore, the defense knew that the co-accused had been convicted and sentenced for the same offenses with which appellant was charged, and he could have impeached the co-accused with the conviction and punishment but chose not to do so; instead the defense counsel argued that the co-accused was testifying because he wanted clemency from the convening authority for his participation in the offenses; in addition, the co-accused’s motive to misrepresent was self-evident to the court members; in fact, it is unclear how knowing that the SJA had agreed to recommend that the convening authority grant the co-accused clemency in exchange for his testimony would have caused the defense counsel to change strategy or tactics or led to a different result; it would not have affected either the defense counsel’s ability to cross-examine the co-accused or his closing argument; finally, had the defense tried to impeach the co-accused with the agreement, the co-accused’s prior statement to law enforcement that was consistent with his testimony at trial would have been admitted to rebut any defense contention that he had a motive to alter his testimony to obtain clemency; even if the military judge would have refused to admit the prior consistent statement for the truth of the matter asserted, it still would have been admissible simply to corroborate, or rehabilitate, the in-court testimony of a witness, regardless of whether it qualified for exception from the hearsay rule under MRE 801(d)(1)(B); while the conduct of the prosecution in not disclosing the oral agreement between the co-accused and the SJA was, at a minimum, negligent, and certainly violated Brady, Article 46, and RCM 701–703, the government established that under the circumstances of this case, its failure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt - disclosure would not have affected the outcome of the trial, and the military judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court will not reverse a military judge’s determination on a mistrial absent clear evidence of an abuse of discretion
2. an appellate court reviews all cases in which the trial counsel failed to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt or sentencing for harmless error - whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different
3. there are two categories of disclosure error: (1) cases in which the defense either did not make a discovery request or made only a general request for discovery; and (2) cases in which the defense made a specific request for the undisclosed information; for cases in the first category, an appellate court applies the harmless error standard; and for cases in the second category, an appellate court applies the heightened constitutional harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard; failing to disclose requested material favorable to the defense is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the undisclosed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial
4. an appellate court’s review of discovery/disclosure issues utilizes a two-step analysis: first, it determines whether the information or evidence at issue was subject to disclosure or discovery; second, if there was nondisclosure of such information, it tests the effect of that nondisclosure on the appellant’s trial