U.S. v. Bradley, 71 M.J. 13

Military Justice Personnel: Defense Function: Effective / Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. in the guilty plea context, the first part of the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel test remains the same - whether counsel’s performance fell below a standard of objective reasonableness expected of all attorneys; the second prong is modified to focus on whether the ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process
2. in determining whether appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel, it is not necessary to decide the issue of deficient performance when it is apparent that the alleged deficiency has not caused prejudice
3. to satisfy the prejudice requirement for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; that requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result
4. when an appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for erroneously waiving a motion, it makes sense to deny the claim if the appellant would not be entitled to relief on the erroneously waived motion, because appellant cannot show he was harmed by not preserving the issue
5. merely being entitled to relief on an erroneously waived motion does not by itself satisfy the prejudice analysis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the guilty plea context; appellant also must satisfy a separate, objective inquiry - he must show that if he had been advised properly, then it would have been rational for him not to plead guilty
6. in this case, where appellant pleaded guilty unconditionally with a pretrial agreement, even if his counsel erroneously informed him that his prior motion to disqualify trial counsel was preserved for appeal, he could not show prejudice to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where it would not have been rational for him to have rejected the plea offer just for the opportunity to change the identity of trial counsel; even if the military judge had disqualified trial counsel, it would not have changed the nature of the evidence appellant faced, the government had a fairly strong case against him, and the plea agreement allowed him to avoid a possible life sentence; appellant failed to draw a link between the disqualified trial counsel and the manner in which trial would have proceeded had trial counsel been disqualified, even assuming he pleaded not guilty

Trial Stages: Appeals: Courts of Criminal Appeals › Generally

1. the CCAs are bound by the CAAF’s conclusions of law on remand
2. in this case on remand from the CAAF, the CCA was substantively bound by the CAAF’s holding that appellant’s mistaken view on whether his motion to disqualify trial counsel was waived did not render his unconditional guilty pleas improvident

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. in determining whether appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel, it is not necessary to decide the issue of deficient performance when it is apparent that the alleged deficiency has not caused prejudice
2. to satisfy the prejudice requirement for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; that requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result
3. when an appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for erroneously waiving a motion, it makes sense to deny the claim if the appellant would not be entitled to relief on the erroneously waived motion, because appellant cannot show he was harmed by not preserving the issue
4. merely being entitled to relief on an erroneously waived motion does not by itself satisfy the prejudice analysis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the guilty plea context; appellant also must satisfy a separate, objective inquiry - he must show that if he had been advised properly, then it would have been rational for him not to plead guilty
5. in this case, where appellant pleaded guilty unconditionally with a pretrial agreement, even if his counsel erroneously informed him that his prior motion to disqualify trial counsel was preserved for appeal, he could not show prejudice to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where it would not have been rational for him to have rejected the plea offer just for the opportunity to change the identity of trial counsel; even if the military judge had disqualified trial counsel, it would not have changed the nature of the evidence appellant faced, the government had a fairly strong case against him, and the plea agreement allowed him to avoid a possible life sentence; appellant failed to draw a link between the disqualified trial counsel and the manner in which trial would have proceeded had trial counsel been disqualified, even assuming he pleaded not guilty

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. an appellate court reviews assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo
2. in the guilty plea context, the first part of the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel test remains the same - whether counsel’s performance fell below a standard of objective reasonableness expected of all attorneys; the second prong is modified to focus on whether the ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process
3. in determining whether appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel, it is not necessary to decide the issue of deficient performance when it is apparent that the alleged deficiency has not caused prejudice
4. to satisfy the prejudice requirement for ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial; a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; that requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result
5. when an appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for erroneously waiving a motion, it makes sense to deny the claim if the appellant would not be entitled to relief on the erroneously waived motion, because appellant cannot show he was harmed by not preserving the issue
6. merely being entitled to relief on an erroneously waived motion does not by itself satisfy the prejudice analysis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the guilty plea context; appellant also must satisfy a separate, objective inquiry - he must show that if he had been advised properly, then it would have been rational for him not to plead guilty