U.S. v. Fry, 70 M.J. 465

First Principles: Jurisdiction: In Personam

1. perhaps no relation between the government and a citizen is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces; for this reason, the scope, nature, legal incidents, and consequences of the relation between persons in service and the government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority; federal law, not state law, is the benchmark by which courts measure whether a person is subject to court-martial jurisdiction
2. under Article 2(c), UCMJ, which makes persons subject to court-martial jurisdiction, notwithstanding any other provision of law, if they submit voluntarily to military authority, meet the mental competence and minimum age qualifications, receive military pay or allowances, and perform military duties, courts-martial need not concern themselves with the legal effect of other clauses in statutes, contracts, or other legal instruments, when deciding whether they have jurisdiction
3. Congress has the power to override state law that would interfere with the servicemember-military relationship, given its distinctively federal character
4. in assessing whether the accused met the mental competency requirements for court-martial jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2(c), UCMJ, the military judge was not bound by a state court order that established a limited conservatorship over the accused, even assuming it was directly on point; the military judge was only required to review the relevant evidence, including the order, to determine whether the requirements for military jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ, were met
5. Article 2(c), UCMJ, sets out a three-part analytical framework for finding jurisdiction; the threshold question is whether the person is serving with an armed force; if that can be established, the analysis proceeds to the four-part test laid out in Article 2(c), which requires findings that the accused: voluntarily submitted to military authority; met the mental and age requirements; received military pay or allowances; and performed military duties; if all four parts of the test are met, then the person is subject to court-martial jurisdiction, until the person is released pursuant to law or regulation
6. voluntariness is a separate and distinct requirement for court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ, that retains its usual meaning; furthermore, voluntariness remains a question evaluated under the traditional rubric of looking at the totality of the relevant circumstances, including the individual’s mental state
7. evidence either that appellant’s actions were compelled by an outside influence, like duress or coercion, or that appellant could not understand the nature or significance of his actions might be reasons to find that he has not acted voluntarily in submitting to military authority for purposes of determining if he is subject to court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ
8. if appellant met the mental competence requirement of Article 2(c)(2) (i.e., not insane under 10 USC § 504), then it is surely evidence that he had the requisite mental capacity to understand the significance of submitting to military authorities, i.e., it would tend to show that he acted voluntarily in that regard
9. section 504 of Title 10 (persons not qualified for enlistment) sets out the mental standard for enlistment in relevant part as no person who is insane may be enlisted in any armed force; the general definition section states that the word insane shall include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non compos mentis; non compos mentis requires something more than merely suffering from a mental disease; the concept envisions someone who is incapable of handling her own affairs or unable to function in society
10. the clear purpose of 10 USC § 504 (persons not qualified for enlistment) was to codify something approximating the common law concept of capacity to contract, in that only those people may enlist who have the ability to understand what it means to enlist
11. given that the concept codified in 10 USC § 504 (persons not qualified for enlistment) is akin to capacity to contract, the events that occurred before and after enlistment are relevant to determining the person’s mental condition on the date the enlistment was executed in determining the mental capacity to enlist
12. the weight of authority seems to hold that mental capacity to contract depends upon whether the allegedly disabled person possessed sufficient reason to enable him to understand the nature and effect of the act in issue; even average intelligence is not essential to a valid bargain
13. in this case, the military judge’s conclusion that jurisdiction existed pursuant to Article 2(c) because appellant was mentally competent to enlist was not clearly erroneous; the evidence of record fairly supported the conclusion that appellant had the capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment and acted voluntarily; although expert testimony conflicted as to whether appellant had the mental capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment, and a state court order entered prior to enlistment established a limited conservatorship over appellant, the military judge concluded that the surrounding circumstances did not sufficiently support appellant’s claim of impulsivity because appellant ultimately managed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, orders, and directives and complete recruit training
14. when faced with conflicting evidence on whether a party is competent, the military judge does not err merely because some evidence points in the opposite direction of the military judge’s ultimate conclusion

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Defenses: Lack of Mental Responsibility

1. if appellant met the mental competence requirement of Article 2(c)(2) (i.e., not insane under 10 USC § 504), then it is surely evidence that he had the requisite mental capacity to understand the significance of submitting to military authorities, i.e., it would tend to show that he acted voluntarily in that regard
2. section 504 of Title 10 (persons not qualified for enlistment) sets out the mental standard for enlistment in relevant part as no person who is insane may be enlisted in any armed force; the general definition section states that the word insane shall include every idiot, lunatic, insane person, and person non compos mentis; non compos mentis requires something more than merely suffering from a mental disease; the concept envisions someone who is incapable of handling her own affairs or unable to function in society
3. the clear purpose of 10 USC § 504 (persons not qualified for enlistment) was to codify something approximating the common law concept of capacity to contract, in that only those people may enlist who have the ability to understand what it means to enlist
4. given that the concept codified in 10 USC § 504 (persons not qualified for enlistment) is akin to capacity to contract, the events that occurred before and after enlistment are relevant to determining the person’s mental condition on the date the enlistment was executed in determining the mental capacity to enlist
5. the weight of authority seems to hold that mental capacity to contract depends upon whether the allegedly disabled person possessed sufficient reason to enable him to understand the nature and effect of the act in issue; even average intelligence is not essential to a valid bargain
6. in this case, the military judge’s conclusion that jurisdiction existed pursuant to Article 2(c) because appellant was mentally competent to enlist was not clearly erroneous; the evidence of record fairly supported the conclusion that appellant had the capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment and acted voluntarily; although expert testimony conflicted as to whether appellant had the mental capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment, and a state court order entered prior to enlistment established a limited conservatorship over appellant, the military judge concluded that the surrounding circumstances did not sufficiently support appellant’s claim of impulsivity because he ultimately managed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, orders, and directives and complete recruit training
7. when faced with conflicting evidence on whether a party is competent, the military judge does not err merely because some evidence points in the opposite direction of the military judge’s ultimate conclusion

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. when an accused contests personal jurisdiction on appeal, an appellate court reviews that question of law de novo, accepting the military judge’s findings of historical facts unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported in the record; whether appellant is mentally competent is a question of fact, and an appellate court will only set aside findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous