U.S. v. Maynulet, 68 M.J. 374

Military Justice Personnel: Military Judge: Instructions

1. generally, a military judge has substantial discretionary power to decide whether to issue a jury instruction
2. a military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct on an affirmative defense if reasonably raised

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Defenses: Generally

1. it is well settled in civil and military law that mistake of law is generally not a defense to criminal conduct; RCM 916(l)(1) provides that ignorance or mistake of law, including general orders or regulations, ordinarily is not a defense; there are a few narrow exceptions to the general rule; one such exception exists when the mistake results from reliance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized public official or agency; however, reliance on the advice of counsel that a certain course of conduct is legal is not, of itself, a defense; in civilian practice, this defense is more generally stated as a reasonable reliance upon an erroneous official statement of the law
2. in a defense of entrapment by estoppel situation, the government is rightly barred from obtaining a conviction because the government - through its representatives acting in an official capacity - is responsible for the defendant’s inability to know that his conduct was proscribed; in this case, there was no evidence in the record to support a claim that there was an official decision, pronouncement, or interpretation, later determined to be erroneous, upon which appellant could have reasonably relied or that could have formed the basis of a claim of estoppel

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Defenses: Affirmative Defenses

1. the test whether an affirmative defense is reasonably raised is whether the record contains some evidence to which the court members may attach credit if they so desire
2. it is well settled in civil and military law that mistake of law is generally not a defense to criminal conduct; RCM 916(l)(1) provides that ignorance or mistake of law, including general orders or regulations, ordinarily is not a defense; there are a few narrow exceptions to the general rule; one such exception exists when the mistake results from reliance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized public official or agency; however, reliance on the advice of counsel that a certain course of conduct is legal is not, of itself, a defense; in civilian practice, this defense is more generally stated as a reasonable reliance upon an erroneous official statement of the law
3. in a defense of entrapment by estoppel situation, the government is rightly barred from obtaining a conviction because the government - through its representatives acting in an official capacity - is responsible for the defendant’s inability to know that his conduct was proscribed; in this case, there was no evidence in the record to support a claim that there was an official decision, pronouncement, or interpretation, later determined to be erroneous, upon which appellant could have reasonably relied or that could have formed the basis of a claim of estoppel
4. a mistake of law defense was not available to appellant who fatally shot a severely injured Iraqi driver of a vehicle that crashed after speeding past a military checkpoint; appellant allegedly had been taught to “ease suffering” during his pre-deployment legal training on the law of war and the rules of engagement, and he claimed that he shot the driver to put him out of his misery; however, the record was devoid of any erroneous pronouncement or interpretation of military law or the law of armed conflict upon which appellant could have reasonably relied to justify his killing of the injured driver; the best appellant could argue was that he had a subjective mistaken belief as to what the law allowed; however, this is the very kind of mistake rejected by the general rule regarding mistake of law; absent from the record was any evidence that appellant received affirmative assurances from briefers or anyone in his chain-of-command that “mercy killing” was lawful; to the contrary, the rules of engagement card carried by appellant in combat specifically instructed him not to engage enemy combatants who were out of battle due to wounds; moreover, appellant had time to consult with both his command and with medical authorities if he had felt that additional legal, medical, or command guidance was needed before deciding how to proceed

Trial Stages: Merits: Instructions › Generally

1. generally, a military judge has substantial discretionary power to decide whether to issue a jury instruction

Trial Stages: Merits: Instructions › Affirmative defenses

1. a military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct on an affirmative defense if reasonably raised

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law, and thus, review is de novo