U.S. v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279

Trial Stages: Merits: Guilty Pleas

1. an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings
2. RCM 910(j) provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any objection, whether or not previously raised, insofar as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilt of the offense to which the plea was made
3. RCM 910(a)(2) provides for conditional guilty pleas as an exception to the general waiver rule; a conditional guilty plea is a creature of statute or regulation; there is no constitutional right to enter such a plea; this being the case, it follows that compliance with the regulation is the sole means of entering a conditional plea and preserving the issue on appeal; such a plea cannot be implied; the military judge and the government each have complete discretion whether to permit or consent to a conditional guilty plea
4. in this case, the CCA erred in concluding that there was a de facto conditional guilty plea, where the CCA determined that the military judge’s ambiguous advisement with regard to waiver and the civilian defense counsel’s belief that the issue was preserved for appellate review were material factors in the accused’s decision to plead guilty and that, accordingly, the accused was entitled to appellate review of his motion to dismiss; such a plea cannot be implied; it can only be manifested by compliance with the conditional guilty plea rule of RCM 910(a)(2)
5. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea waived his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel based on that counsel having served as a witness in a pretrial motion hearing, as well as a motion to dismiss based on the government’s alleged derivative use of his immunized statements and testimony; the record was clear that neither the government nor the military judge consented to a conditional plea as required by RCM 910(a)(2)
6. while the waiver doctrine, under which an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings, is not without limits, those limits are narrow and relate to situations in which, on their face, the prosecution may not constitutionally be maintained; this case is not such a situation, and the waiver doctrine therefore applies
7. a guilty plea will not be rejected as improvident unless there is a substantial basis in law or fact for doing so
8. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea, resulting in waiver of his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel and his motion to dismiss, was not improvident, even if the accused thought the disqualification issue would be preserved, where the accused was represented by experienced civilian defense counsel, the accused explicitly entered an unconditional plea of guilty, and there is no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the accused (who was getting the benefits of a quite favorable pretrial agreement) did not understand what he was doing

Trial Stages: Appeals: Waiver

1. an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings
2. RCM 910(j) provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any objection, whether or not previously raised, insofar as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilt of the offense to which the plea was made
3. RCM 910(a)(2) provides for conditional guilty pleas as an exception to the general waiver rule; a conditional guilty plea is a creature of statute or regulation; there is no constitutional right to enter such a plea; this being the case, it follows that compliance with the regulation is the sole means of entering a conditional plea and preserving the issue on appeal; such a plea cannot be implied; the military judge and the government each have complete discretion whether to permit or consent to a conditional guilty plea
4. in this case, the CCA erred in concluding that there was a de facto conditional guilty plea, where the CCA determined that the military judge’s ambiguous advisement with regard to waiver and the civilian defense counsel’s belief that the issue was preserved for appellate review were material factors in the accused’s decision to plead guilty and that, accordingly, the accused was entitled to appellate review of his motion to dismiss; such a plea cannot be implied; it can only be manifested by compliance with the conditional guilty plea rule of RCM 910(a)(2)
5. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea waived his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel based on that counsel having served as a witness in a pretrial motion hearing, as well as a motion to dismiss based on the government’s alleged derivative use of his immunized statements and testimony; the record was clear that neither the government nor the military judge consented to a conditional plea as required by RCM 910(a)(2)
6. while the waiver doctrine, under which an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings, is not without limits, those limits are narrow and relate to situations in which, on its face, the prosecution may not constitutionally be maintained; this case is not such a situation, and the waiver doctrine therefore applies
7. a guilty plea will not be rejected as improvident unless there is a substantial basis in law or fact for doing so
8. (the accused’s unconditional guilty plea, resulting in waiver of his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel and his motion to dismiss, was not improvident, even if the accused thought the disqualification issue would be preserved, where the accused was represented by experienced civilian defense counsel, the accused explicitly entered an unconditional plea of guilty, and there is no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the accused (who was getting the benefits of a quite favorable pretrial agreement) did not understand what he was doing). United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279 (an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings)
9. RCM 910(j) provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any objection, whether or not previously raised, insofar as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilt of the offense to which the plea was made
10. RCM 910(a)(2) provides for conditional guilty pleas as an exception to the general waiver rule; a conditional guilty plea is a creature of statute or regulation; there is no constitutional right to enter such a plea; this being the case, it follows that compliance with the regulation is the sole means of entering a conditional plea and preserving the issue on appeal; such a plea cannot be implied; the military judge and the government each have complete discretion whether to permit or consent to a conditional guilty plea
11. in this case, the CCA erred in concluding that there was a de facto conditional guilty plea, where the CCA determined that the military judge’s ambiguous advisement with regard to waiver and the civilian defense counsel’s belief that the issue was preserved for appellate review were material factors in the accused’s decision to plead guilty and that, accordingly, the accused was entitled to appellate review of his motion to dismiss; such a plea cannot be implied; it can only be manifested by compliance with the conditional guilty plea rule of RCM 910(a)(2)
12. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea waived his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel based on that counsel having served as a witness in a pretrial motion hearing, as well as a motion to dismiss based on the government’s alleged derivative use of his immunized statements and testimony; the record was clear that neither the government nor the military judge consented to a conditional plea as required by RCM 910(a)(2)
13. while the waiver doctrine, under which an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings, is not without limits, those limits are narrow and relate to situations in which, on their face, the prosecution may not constitutionally be maintained; this case is not such a situation, and the waiver doctrine therefore applies
14. a guilty plea will not be rejected as improvident unless there is a substantial basis in law or fact for doing so
15. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea, resulting in waiver of his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel and his motion to dismiss, was not improvident, even if the accused thought the disqualification issue would be preserved, where the accused was represented by experienced civilian defense counsel, the accused explicitly entered an unconditional plea of guilty, and there is no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the accused (who was getting the benefits of a quite favorable pretrial agreement) did not understand what he was doing
16. an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings
17. RCM 910(j) provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any objection, whether or not previously raised, insofar as the objection relates to the factual issue of guilt of the offense to which the plea was made
18. RCM 910(a)(2) provides for conditional guilty pleas as an exception to the general waiver rule; a conditional guilty plea is a creature of statute or regulation; there is no constitutional right to enter such a plea; this being the case, it follows that compliance with the regulation is the sole means of entering a conditional plea and preserving the issue on appeal; such a plea cannot be implied; the military judge and the government each have complete discretion whether to permit or consent to a conditional guilty plea
19. in this case, the CCA erred in concluding that there was a de facto conditional guilty plea, where the CCA determined that the military judge’s ambiguous advisement with regard to waiver and the civilian defense counsel’s belief that the issue was preserved for appellate review were material factors in the accused’s decision to plead guilty and that, accordingly, the accused was entitled to appellate review of his motion to dismiss; such a plea cannot be implied; it can only be manifested by compliance with the conditional guilty plea rule of RCM 910(a)(2)
20. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea waived his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel based on that counsel having served as a witness in a pretrial motion hearing, as well as a motion to dismiss based on the government’s alleged derivative use of his immunized statements and testimony; the record was clear that neither the government nor the military judge consented to a conditional plea as required by RCM 910(a)(2)
21. while the waiver doctrine, under which an unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier stages of the proceedings, is not without limits, those limits are narrow and relate to situations in which, on its face, the prosecution may not constitutionally be maintained; this case is not such a situation, and the waiver doctrine therefore applies
22. a guilty plea will not be rejected as improvident unless there is a substantial basis in law or fact for doing so
23. the accused’s unconditional guilty plea, resulting in waiver of his ability to appeal the military judge’s denial of his motion to disqualify trial counsel and his motion to dismiss, was not improvident, even if the accused thought the disqualification issue would be preserved, where the accused was represented by experienced civilian defense counsel, the accused explicitly entered an unconditional plea of guilty, and there is no allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the accused (who was getting the benefits of a quite favorable pretrial agreement) did not understand what he was doing