U.S. v. Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 110

First Principles: Jurisdiction: Of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. Article 67(b), UCMJ, provides that an accused may petition the CAAF for review of a decision of a CCA within sixty days from the earlier of the date upon which the accused is actually notified or the date upon which he or she is constructively notified of the decision of the CCA; this congressionally-created statutory period within which an accused may file a petition for grant of review is jurisdictional
2. where appellant filed his petition for grant of review at the CAAF outside the sixty-day statutory period for the filing of such petitions, the CAAF did not have authority to entertain the petition for review because the sixty-day period was jurisdictional and could not be waived
3. where a time limitation for an appeal is derived from a statute, the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional; statute-based rules of limitation are distinguished from those having their origin in court-created rules; there is jurisdictional significance in the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute because only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; in contrast, the rule-based time limit may be waived because the procedural rules adopted by a court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the court in the exercise of its discretion; an important distinction between the jurisdictional statute-based limitations and those created within a court’s internal rules is that the courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements
4. the entire system of military justice is a creature of statute, enacted by Congress pursuant to the express constitutional grant of power to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; in Articles 141 through 146, UCMJ, Congress provided the source authority for the existence of the CAAF; the CAAF’s authority or subject matter jurisdiction is defined by Article 67, UCMJ
5. under the plain language of Article 67(b), UCMJ, the provision governing petitions for review of CCA decisions, an appellant may file a petition for grant of review with the CAAF, and, if he or she chooses to do so, it must be done within the sixty-day time limitation; nothing within Article 67(b)’s statute-based time limitation is permissive and there is no indication that the CAAF can waive the limitation for equitable reasons
6. the legislative history of Article 67(b), UCMJ, reflects that Congress intended the sixty-day appeal period to the CAAF to be a statute–based limitation and mandatory; only the opportunity to petition for review is permissive; the time within which to do so is not; any other construction of the relationship between opportunity to petition and the time within which to file is inconsistent with the expressed congressional desire to achieve finality; if the time limitation is triggered and an accused does not act, Congress intended the matter to end
7. the opportunity to petition the CAAF lapses or expires by statute when the sixty-day statute-based limitation is not met, and the sixty-day limitation is jurisdictional and mandatory; relief from that time limitation does not rest in the discretion of the court; to the extent that US v. Tamez (63 MJ 201 (2006)) and earlier cases of the court are inconsistent with this holding, they are overruled

Trial Stages: Appeals: Generally

1. where a time limitation for an appeal is derived from a statute, the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional; statute-based rules of limitation are distinguished from those having their origin in court-created rules; there is jurisdictional significance in the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute because only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; in contrast, the rule-based time limit may be waived because the procedural rules adopted by a court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the court in the exercise of its discretion; an important distinction between the jurisdictional statute-based limitations and those created within a court’s internal rules is that the courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements

Trial Stages: Appeals: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. Article 67(b), UCMJ, provides that an accused may petition the CAAF for review of a decision of a CCA within sixty days from the earlier of the date upon which the accused is actually notified or the date upon which he or she is constructively notified of the decision of the CCA; this congressionally-created statutory period within which an accused may file a petition for grant of review is jurisdictional
2. where appellant filed his petition for grant of review at the CAAF outside the sixty-day statutory period for the filing of such petitions, the CAAF did not have authority to entertain the petition for review because the sixty-day period was jurisdictional and could not be waived
3. where a time limitation for an appeal is derived from a statute, the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional; statute-based rules of limitation are distinguished from those having their origin in court-created rules; there is jurisdictional significance in the fact that a time limitation is set forth in a statute because only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; in contrast, the rule-based time limit may be waived because the procedural rules adopted by a court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the court in the exercise of its discretion; an important distinction between the jurisdictional statute-based limitations and those created within a court’s internal rules is that the courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements
4. the entire system of military justice is a creature of statute, enacted by Congress pursuant to the express constitutional grant of power to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; in Articles 141 through 146, UCMJ, Congress provided the source authority for the existence of the CAAF; the CAAF’s authority or subject matter jurisdiction is defined by Article 67, UCMJ
5. under the plain language of Article 67(b), UCMJ, the provision governing petitions for review of CCA decisions, an appellant may file a petition for grant of review with the CAAF, and, if he or she chooses to do so, it must be done within the sixty-day time limitation; nothing within Article 67(b)’s statute-based time limitation is permissive and there is no indication that the CAAF can waive the limitation for equitable reasons
6. the legislative history of Article 67(b), UCMJ, reflects that Congress intended the sixty-day appeal period to the CAAF to be a statute–based limitation and mandatory; only the opportunity to petition for review is permissive; the time within which to do so is not; any other construction of the relationship between opportunity to petition and the time within which to file is inconsistent with the expressed congressional desire to achieve finality; if the time limitation is triggered and an accused does not act, Congress intended the matter to end
7. the opportunity to petition the CAAF lapses or expires by statute when the sixty-day statute-based limitation is not met, and the sixty-day limitation is jurisdictional and mandatory; relief from that time limitation does not rest in the discretion of the court; to the extent that earlier cases of the court are inconsistent with this holding, they are overruled

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. the entire system of military justice is a creature of statute, enacted by Congress pursuant to the express constitutional grant of power to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; in Articles 141 through 146, UCMJ, Congress provided the source authority for the existence of the CAAF; the CAAF’s authority or subject matter jurisdiction is defined by Article 67, UCMJ
2. the legislative history of Article 67(b), UCMJ, reflects that Congress intended the sixty-day appeal period to the CAAF to be a statute–based limitation and mandatory; only the opportunity to petition for review is permissive; the time within which to do so is not; any other construction of the relationship between opportunity to petition and the time within which to file is inconsistent with the expressed congressional desire to achieve finality; if the time limitation is triggered and an accused does not act, Congress intended the matter to end