U.S. v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67

First Principles: Jurisdiction: Of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. the CAAF, like all federal courts, is a court of limited jurisdiction; that jurisdiction is conferred ultimately by the Constitution, and immediately by statute; however, this principle does not mean that the CAAF’s jurisdiction is to be determined by teasing out a particular provision of a statute and reading it apart from the whole; since the beginning of jurisprudence under the UCMJ, the CAAF has read the statutes governing its jurisdiction as an integrated whole, with the purpose of carrying out the intent of Congress in enacting them; the CAAF believes it axiomatic that Article 67 must be interpreted in light of the overall jurisdictional concept intended by the Congress, and not through the selective narrow reading of individual sentences within the article
2. the CAAF has statutory authority under Article 67(a), UCMJ, to exercise jurisdiction over decisions of the courts of criminal appeals rendered pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ

Trial Stages: Pretrial: Charges and Specifications

1. in 2003, Congress amended Article 43(b)(1), UCMJ, to except from the general five-year statute of limitations certain child abuse offenses, listed in Article 43(b)(2)(B), UCMJ, including indecent acts and liberties with a child; the statute of limitations for these offenses would expire when the child reached the age of twenty-five years; a further amendment in 2006 changed the limitation period to the greater of the life of the child or five years after the offense
2. the 2003 congressional amendment to the statute of limitations, Article 43(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 843(b), that extended the statute of limitations for child abuse offenses from five years to a child victim’s twenty-fifth birthday, does not apply retroactively to offenses committed before the amendment’s effective date, considering the lack of any indication of congressional intent to apply the 2003 amendment retrospectively, the general presumption against retrospective legislation in the absence of such an indication, and the general presumption of liberal construction of criminal statutes of limitation in favor of repose

Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: Article 62 Appeal

1. prior to 1983, there was no statutory provision for interlocutory appeals by the government in courts-martial; such issues were reviewable only in the context of petitions for extraordinary relief; the Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-209 (1983), amended Article 62 of the UCMJ to provide for a government appeal of rulings by a military judge that terminated proceedings with respect to a charge or specification or that excluded evidence that was substantial proof of a material fact; the President, in his contemporaneous implementation of the Act, expressly provided for appeal of adverse Article 62, UCMJ, decisions to the CAAF, and from the CAAF to the Supreme Court
2. cases appealed under Article 62, UCMJ, which authorizes government interlocutory appeals to the courts of criminal appeals, may be reviewed by the CAAF under its Article 67(a), UCMJ, statutory review authority

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a question of statutory construction is a question of law to be decided de novo

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. while Congress certainly possesses the constitutional authority to apply legislation retroactively, subject to the limits of the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, retroactive application of statutes is normally not favored in the absence of explicit language in the statute or necessary implication therefrom; this principle applies to statutes of limitations
2. catchlines or section headings in a title to a congressional amendment are not part of a statute; they cannot vary its plain meaning and are available for interpretive purposes only if they can shed light on some ambiguity in the text

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: United States Code

1. in 2003, Congress amended Article 43(b)(1), UCMJ, to except from the general five-year statute of limitations certain child abuse offenses, listed in Article 43(b)(2)(B), UCMJ, including indecent acts and liberties with a child; the statute of limitations for these offenses would expire when the child reached the age of twenty-five years; a further amendment in 2006 changed the limitation period to the greater of the life of the child or five years after the offense
2. while Congress certainly possesses the constitutional authority to apply legislation retroactively, subject to the limits of the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, retroactive application of statutes is normally not favored in the absence of explicit language in the statute or necessary implication therefrom; this principle applies to statutes of limitations
3. catchlines or section headings in a title to a congressional amendment are not part of a statute; they cannot vary its plain meaning and are available for interpretive purposes only if they can shed light on some ambiguity in the text
4. the 2003 congressional amendment to the statute of limitations, Article 43(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 843(b), that extended the statute of limitations for child abuse offenses from five years to a child victim’s twenty-fifth birthday, does not apply retroactively to offenses committed before the amendment’s effective date, considering the lack of any indication of congressional intent to apply the 2003 amendment retrospectively, the general presumption against retrospective legislation in the absence of such an indication, and the general presumption of liberal construction of criminal statutes of limitation in favor of repose