U.S. v. Canchola, 64 M.J. 245

Military Justice Personnel: Staff Judge Advocate: Responsibilities

1. where operational requirements affect post-trial processing delays, staff judge advocates and convening authorities should ensure that those reasons are documented in the record of trial

Military Justice Personnel: Convening Authority: Generally

1. where operational requirements affect post-trial processing delays, staff judge advocates and convening authorities should ensure that those reasons are documented in the record of trial

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a claim of denial of a due process right to speedy post-trial review is evaluated under the four factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of his right to timely post-trial review and appeal; and (4) prejudice
2. the high demands placed upon military personnel in supporting the national interests of the United States, particularly in combat or hostile environments, is an appropriate consideration when assessing the post-trial delay factors under the Barker analysis; where operational requirements affect post-trial processing delays, staff judge advocates and convening authorities should ensure that those reasons are documented in the record of trial; reviewing courts can then weigh and balance those reasons in determining whether they provide adequate explanation for any apparent post-trial delays; however, a general reliance on budgetary and manpower constraints will not constitute reasonable grounds for delay nor cause this factor to weigh in favor of the government
3. in balancing the Barker factors, in cases where an appellate court finds no prejudice under the fourth prong, a due process violation will result only when, in balancing the other three factors, the delay is so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Post-Trial

1. a claim of denial of a due process right to speedy post-trial review is evaluated under the four factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of his right to timely post-trial review and appeal; and (4) prejudice
2. the high demands placed upon military personnel in supporting the national interests of the United States, particularly in combat or hostile environments, is an appropriate consideration when assessing the post-trial delay factors under the Barker analysis; where operational requirements affect post-trial processing delays, staff judge advocates and convening authorities should ensure that those reasons are documented in the record of trial; reviewing courts can then weigh and balance those reasons in determining whether they provide adequate explanation for any apparent post-trial delays; however, a general reliance on budgetary and manpower constraints will not constitute reasonable grounds for delay nor cause this factor to weigh in favor of the government
3. in this case, the staff judge advocate’s proffered explanation for the post-trial delay was too general to demonstrate that the “unforeseeable events” had a reasonably direct impact on the timeliness of post-trial processing; in particular, after the military judge authenticated the record of trial, 503 days elapsed before the staff judge advocate’s recommendation was prepared; the post-trial recommendation was barely four pages long and contained nothing that appeared to be unusual or to have warranted substantial additional preparation time; the record upon which that recommendation was based was a fifty-nine page guilty plea; in short, the proffered general explanation for this glaring delay in reviewing a relatively simple case did not withstand scrutiny; accordingly, the absence of reasons for the delay in post-trial processing caused the second Barker factor to weigh somewhat in appellant’s favor
4. in balancing the Barker factors, in cases where an appellate court finds no prejudice under the fourth prong, a due process violation will result only when, in balancing the other three factors, the delay is so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system
5. appellant was not denied his due process right to a timely post-trial review and speedy appeal where although the delay of 1,263 days between sentencing and the decision of the lower court was facially unreasonable and the reasons for the delay weighed somewhat in appellant’s favor, appellant failed to make a timely assertion of his right to speedy review and failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay; also, the delay was not so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system