U.S. v. Allison, 63 M.J. 365

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Expert / Scientific Testimony

1. a witness may testify as an expert on a particular subject matter only if the military judge determines that the witness is qualified based on his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding that subject
2. the facts or data that an expert relies upon in a particular case may be referenced before the trial and if of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences, the data need not be admissible in order for the opinion to be admitted
3. the military judge has broad discretion as the gatekeeper to determine whether the party offering expert testimony has established an adequate foundation with respect to reliability and relevance
4. DNA testing is sufficiently reliable and is admissible at courts-martial if a proper foundation is laid
5. statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis and their use has been widely researched and discussed; like the underlying DNA analysis, this statistical evidence also is admissible at court-martial so long as a proper foundation is laid
6. where the scientific evidence being offered is not novel, the proponent of the evidence needs to show only that the proffered expert relied upon sufficient facts or data, used reliable principles and methodology, and possessed sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; if the opposing party then wishes to challenge admissibility of the proffered evidence based on the data or methodology relied upon, that party has the opportunity to do so
7. evidence of statistical probabilities is not only basic to DNA analysis, but also essential to the admissibility of that analysis; without evidence of statistical frequencies, DNA evidence is meaningless and would not be admissible
8. although statistical probabilities may be basic to DNA analysis, it does not necessarily follow that all experts qualified to give testimony on DNA analysis will be qualified to testify regarding statistical frequencies; nor does it necessarily follow, however, that a witness must be an expert population geneticist to explain and testify about the methodology and calculations used to determine the statistical probability of a match between two DNA samples
9. the military judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing witnesses to testify regarding the statistical frequencies establishing the relevance of the DNA evidence where there was sufficient evidence from which the military judge could determine that they possessed the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify about the databases upon which they relied, their method of calculation, and the results of their statistical frequency determinations; the record reflected that the witnesses had received training in DNA statistical analysis and both had considerable experience in conducting that analysis; both experts responded to questions regarding their statistical conclusions and their understanding of the databases upon which their calculations relied; the testimony also established that the method of calculation utilized in the analysis had been developed by statisticians and was widely accepted

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Experts

1. a witness may testify as an expert on a particular subject matter only if the military judge determines that the witness is qualified based on his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding that subject
2. although statistical probabilities may be basic to DNA analysis, it does not necessarily follow that all experts qualified to give testimony on DNA analysis will be qualified to testify regarding statistical frequencies; nor does it necessarily follow, however, that a witness must be an expert population geneticist to explain and testify about the methodology and calculations used to determine the statistical probability of a match between two DNA samples
3. the military judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing witnesses to testify regarding the statistical frequencies establishing the relevance of the DNA evidence where there was sufficient evidence from which the military judge could determine that they possessed the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify about the databases upon which they relied, their method of calculation, and the results of their statistical frequency determinations; the record reflected that the witnesses had received training in DNA statistical analysis and both had considerable experience in conducting that analysis; both experts responded to questions regarding their statistical conclusions and their understanding of the databases upon which their calculations relied; the testimony also established that the method of calculation utilized in the analysis had been developed by statisticians and was widely accepted

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. if an appellate court concludes that an appellant has been denied the due process right to speedy post-trial review and appeal, it grants relief unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error is harmless
2. as a general matter, an appellate court can dispose of an issue by assuming error and proceeding directly to the conclusion that any error was harmless
3. issues involving possible constitutional error can be resolved by assuming error and concluding that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
4. in cases involving claims that an appellant has been denied his due process right to speedy post-trial review and appeal, an appellate court may look initially to whether the denial of due process, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
5. assuming that a delay of over five years to complete the accused’s appeal of right denied him his right to speedy review and appeal, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was no merit in the accused’s other issue on appeal and the totality of the circumstances of this case were considered

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a military judge’s decision regarding the qualifications of an expert witness is reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion
2. in analyzing whether appellate delay has violated the due process rights of an accused, an appellate court first looks at whether the delay in question is facially unreasonable; if it is, then this court examines and balances the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right to timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice
3. if an appellate court concludes that an appellant has been denied the due process right to speedy post-trial review and appeal, it grants relief unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error is harmless
4. whether an appellant has been denied the due process right to a speedy post-trial review and appeal, and whether constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt are reviewed de novo

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Post-Trial

1. assuming that a delay of over five years to complete the accused’s appeal of right denied him his right to speedy review and appeal, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was no merit in the accused’s other issue on appeal and the totality of the circumstances of this case were considered