U.S. v. Disney, 62 M.J. 46

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Generally

1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 842 (h) (storing stolen explosives that have been shipped in interstate commerce) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause; the disposition of stolen explosives which are moving as, which are part of, which constitute, or which have been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce clearly falls within the scope of Congress’s enumerated Article I, Section 8 regulatory powers

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Crimes: Art. 134 - Miscellaneous -- Clause 1, Clause 2, or Clause 3 Pre-2019 offenses

1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 842 (h) (storing stolen explosives that have been shipped in interstate commerce) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause; the disposition of stolen explosives which are moving as, which are part of, which constitute, or which have been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce clearly falls within the scope of Congress’s enumerated Article I, Section 8 regulatory powers
2. Title 18 U.S.C. § 842 (h) (storing stolen explosives that have been shipped in interstate commerce) is constitutional as applied to appellant’s conduct; first, the statute regulates economic activity and appellant’s conduct fell within the scope of that regulated activity; section 842(h) was enacted as an essential part of a comprehensive federal legislative scheme to effectively regulate the sale, storage, transfer, or other disposition of explosives in interstate commerce; second, the statute includes an express jurisdictional element, and appellant conceded this element at trial when he stated that the contraband had moved in interstate or foreign commerce because it had been produced outside of California (the locus of the crime); third, the stated purpose of section 842(h) and the statute’s associated legislative history demonstrate that Congress found the illegal use and unsafe storage of contraband explosives to be a substantial hazard to interstate commerce; and fourth, there is a rational basis for concluding that appellant’s storage of stolen explosives has substantial direct implications for commerce; regardless of the actual impact of appellant’s particular conduct, his storage of stolen explosives fell within a class of commercial activity within Congress’s power to regulate; appellant’s actions diverted explosives out of the legal interstate market where they could be monitored and regulated and diverted them to his garage where federal regulations no longer applied regarding their storage or possible reentry into the marketplace

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the constitutionality of an act of Congress is reviewed by an appellate court de novo

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: United States Code

1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 842 (h) (storing stolen explosives that have been shipped in interstate commerce) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause; the disposition of stolen explosives which are moving as, which are part of, which constitute, or which have been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce clearly falls within the scope of Congress’s enumerated Article I, Section 8 regulatory powers
2. Congress may regulate three broad categories of conduct pursuant to its commerce power: the channels of interstate commerce, such as highways and rail lines; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, such as vehicles and goods; and those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, such as intrastate coal mining or hotels catering to interstate guests; even if activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
3. an appellate court looks at four considerations in its analysis of whether an activity regulated by Congress substantially affects interstate commerce: (1) whether the statute regulates economic or non-economic activity; (2) whether the statute contains an express jurisdictional element; (3) whether Congress made findings regarding the connection to interstate commerce; and (4) whether the link between the prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce is attenuated

Miscellaneous Matters: Judicial Review: Standing

1. appellant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 842 (h) on Commerce Clause grounds where he was charged under Article 134, Clause 3 for a crime and offense not capital; the MCM provides that if conduct is charged as a violation of Article 134, Clause 3, the proof must establish every element of the crime or offense as required by the applicable law; section 842(h) contains a statutory jurisdictional element that invokes Congress’s Commerce Clause authority (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) to regulate interstate commerce; were an appellate court to conclude that element is unconstitutional as applied to appellant’s conduct, the statute would no longer constitute a crime or offense of which he could be found guilty; thus, the language of the specified offense itself requires that an appellate court address appellant’s claim