U.S. v. Johnson, 62 M.J. 31

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Motive

1. the mere lack of money, without more, as proof of motive, has little tendency to prove that a person committed a crime; the problem with poverty evidence without more to show motive is not just that it is unfair to poor people, but that it does not prove much, because almost everyone, poor or not, has a motive to get more money; and most people, rich or poor, do not steal to get it; in short, wherever one falls on the financial spectrum, there is a critical distinction between an interest in having more money and an inclination to engage in wrongdoing to meet that interest; thus, a mere interest, unconnected with inclination, desperation, or other evidence that the person was likely to commit the crime does not add much, in most cases, to the probability that the defendant committed a crime; whatever marginal probative value impecuniosity alone may possess, there is too great a risk of raising the impermissible inference that an accused committed the offense because of his modest financial means, a description that might apply to many members of the armed forces, as well as the public at large
2. where the moving party can demonstrate a specific relevant link to the offense in question, financial evidence may be relevant to establish motive; thus, courts have permitted financial status evidence in cases where the evidence in question reflects imminent and dire financial need, unexplained wealth, or that an accused is living beyond his means
3. the military judge abused his discretion in admitting the accused’s bank records at trial for the purpose of showing a motive to transport and distribute drugs; the bank records did not do more than establish a poor financial position; they did not show a sudden change in financial circumstance, an imminent and extraordinary financial burden, or an accused living beyond his means; admission of these records in the absence of other relevant circumstances to show motive tended to raise the very presumption the law seeks to preclude, namely, that those who are not well-off cannot live within a budget and that they crave money and will commit crime to obtain it; the bank records were negligibly relevant, if at all, and the probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

Trial Stages: Sentence and Punishment: Unsworn Statements

1. the right of an accused to make an unsworn statement is long-standing, predating adoption of the UCMJ; among other things, the unsworn statement is an opportunity for an accused to bring information to the attention of the members or a military judge, including matters in extenuation, mitigation, and rebuttal, without ordinary evidentiary constraints; such a right is consistent with the UCMJ’s individualized approach to sentencing; the right of allocution has been described as broadly construed and largely unfettered
2. although the right of allocution is largely unfettered and generally considered unrestricted, it is not wholly unrestricted; the unsworn statement remains a product of RCM 1001(c) and thus remains defined in scope by the rule’s reference to matters presented in extenuation, mitigation, and rebuttal
3. presenting exculpatory polygraph evidence in an unsworn statement raises particular concerns on sentencing; first, such evidence squarely implicates the admonition against impeaching or relitigating the verdict on sentencing; this admonition is based on the principle that an accused is entitled to vigorously contest his innocence on findings, but is not entitled to do so on sentencing; sentencing is intended to afford the members the opportunity to focus on and address matters appropriate for individualized consideration of an accused’s sentence; the exculpatory polygraph evidence presented in this case could not reasonably have been offered for any reason other than to suggest to the members that their findings of guilty were wrong; second, this information does not qualify in any way as extenuation, mitigation, or rebuttal under RCM 1001(c); thus, the military judge did not err by precluding the accused from referencing the results of the polygraph test during his unsworn statement

Trial Stages: Initial Review: Action

1. when acting on the sentence, under Article 60, UCMJ, the convening authority may reduce or suspend adjudged forfeitures, thereby increasing the compensation that is subject to mandatory forfeitures, which in turn may be waived for up to six months for the servicemember’s dependents under Article 58(b)

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. the erroneous admission of the evidence of the accused’s bank records for the purpose of showing a motive to transport and distribute drugs was harmless considering the strength of the government’s case and the limitations inherent in the defense presentation that the accused lacked knowledge of the contents of the box he was transporting

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. a military judge’s ruling on admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion; to be overturned on appeal, the military judge’s ruling must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable or clearly erroneous, or influenced by an erroneous view of the law
2. an appellate court tests the erroneous admission of evidence to determine whether the error materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused; for a nonconstitutional error, the government must demonstrate that the error did not have a substantial influence on the findings; in the case of erroneously admitted government evidence, the court weighs: (1) the strength of the government’s case; (2) the strength of the defense case; (3) the materiality of the evidence in question; and, (4) the quality of the evidence in question