Loving v. U.S., 62 M.J. 235

Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: Appropriateness of Forum

1. federal courts typically will not entertain habeas petitions by military prisoners unless all available military remedies have been exhausted

Trial Stages: Writs and Interlocutory Appeals: All Writs Act

1. while the All Writs Act authorizes employment of extraordinary writs, it confines the authority to the issuance of process in aid of the issuing court’s jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge that jurisdiction; the power of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces under the All Writs Act is essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other adequate remedies at law; a writ may not be used when another method of review will suffice; the All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute; where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act that is controlling
2. a writ of error coram nobis remains appropriate when no other remedy is available; if a court may issue a writ of habeas corpus under the All Writs Act to address issues raised by petitioner, a coram nobis writ is not appropriate; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is empowered under the All Writs Act to grant extraordinary relief where appropriate; the writ of habeas corpus is available to the military accused and may be filed in this Court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); the writ of coram nobis is thus an inappropriate procedural vehicle for a petitioner to challenge the legality of his death sentence because a writ of habeas corpus is the proper pleading

Trial Stages: Appeals: Generally

1. every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction

Trial Stages: Appeals: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

1. as an Article I court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is a court of limited jurisdiction; it may not act unless Congress has given it the authority to do so; Congress has confined the CAAF’s jurisdiction to review of specified sentences imposed by courts-martial; the CAAF has the power to act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the court-martial’s convening authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by the Court of Criminal Appeals
2. a primary responsibility of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is the supervision of the military justice system through appellate review
3. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has collateral review jurisdiction over a military death penalty case and may entertain assertions of error as to the legality of the sentence in the period after there is a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings under Article 71(c)(1), with the completion of direct review, but before the case is final under Article 76 with the approval of the sentence by the President; a capital case is final with the meaning of Article 76 only after the President, acting under Article 71(a), approves it; as finality under Article 76 is the terminal point for proceedings within the court-martial and military justice system, the CAAF’s jurisdiction continues until a case is final
4. Article 67(a) vests the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces with subject matter jurisdiction over military capital cases; but such cases are not final under Article 76 until the President orders the sentence executed; thus, the CAAF’s subject matter jurisdiction continues even after a Supreme Court’s decision affirming a petitioner’s death sentence
5. a petition for writ of error coram nobis was not the appropriate procedural vehicle to seek collateral review of a death penalty by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces during the period after completion of direct review, but before approval of the sentence by the President; a writ of habeas corpus was the only pleading available to raise the substantive challenges to the legality of the death sentence

Miscellaneous Matters: Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Executive Orders, Directives, etc.: Generally

1. it is a fundamental tenet of statutory construction to construe a statute in accordance with its plain meaning
2. from the plain meaning of Article 71(a), it is clear and undisputed that the President must “approve” a sentence of death before it is executed; it is equally clear from the plain words of Articles 71(a) and 76 that the President must “approve” a sentence of death before a capital case is final within the meaning of Article 76; furthermore, this reading of the plain text is supported by the legislative history of Article 76
3. from the plain language of Articles 71 and 76 and the Supreme Court’s construction of Article 76, a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings under Article 71(c) does not result in a case being final for the purposes of Article 76
4. Article 71(c) requires “a final judgment as to the legality of the proceedings” to render a death sentence ripe for approval by the President; Article 76 requires that the President approve a death sentence before the sentence is final, thereby describing the terminal point for proceedings within the court-martial system