U.S. v. James, 61 M.J. 132

Military Justice Personnel: Court Members: Challenges for Cause

1. a member of a court-martial panel may be removed for cause if it is shown that he or she has an inelastic opinion concerning an appropriate sentence for the offenses charged
2. an accused has a constitutional right, as well as a regulatory right, to a fair and impartial panel; a member may be removed for cause if it is shown that he or she should not sit in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality; an inelastic opinion concerning an appropriate sentence for the offenses charged may be grounds for challenge; the party that makes the challenge for cause has the burden of proving that grounds for a challenge exist
3. in evaluating challenges for cause based on claims of inelastic attitude, this Court has held that an unfavorable inclination toward an offense is not automatically disqualifying; the test is whether the member’s attitude is of such a nature that he will not yield to the evidence presented and the judge’s instructions
4. in the context of challenges brought by an accused, military judges must liberally grant challenges for cause; the liberal grant policy supports the UCMJ’s interest in ensuring that members of the military have their guilt or innocence determined by a panel composed of individuals with a fair and open mind
5. given the convening authority’s broad power to appoint the panel, there is no basis for application of the liberal grant policy when a military judge is ruling on the government’s challenges for cause
6. the military judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the government’s challenge for cause of a court-martial member on the basis of that member’s inelastic predisposition toward sentencing in a drug case; the military judge found that the member wavered when asked if she could consider the entire range of punishments and expressed her concerns regarding punishments in drug cases both verbally and nonverbally, and his conclusion that she would have trouble considering the entire range of punishments was not clearly erroneous

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Impeachment

1. MRE 608(c) provides that bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Confrontation

1. a judge may limit the defense’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding the terms of a plea agreement entered into by the witness, so long as adequate inquiry into possible bias of that witness has been allowed through other lines of questioning
2. this Court has recognized that the exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination; it does not follow that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness; on the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant
3. a military judge did not impermissibly infringe upon an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by precluding the defense from questioning a witness regarding a specific term of the witness’s pretrial agreement where the judge allowed inquiry into the possible bias and motive to lie of the witness through other questions about his pretrial agreement - specifically that (1) he had a pretrial agreement in his own court-martial; (2) as part of that pretrial agreement he pleaded guilty and entered into a stipulation of facts; (3) he had immunity for his testimony in the accused’s court-martial; (4) his pretrial agreement required him to cooperate with the Government against his best friend; and (5) although he had been sentenced, clemency was still pending in his case, and as part of that process, he would be able to tell the convening authority that he had cooperated and testified against the accused; the limitations placed on cross-examination by the military judge were within his discretion and did not affect the accused’s core constitutional right to cross-examination; once the defense had been allowed to expose the witness’s motivation in testifying, it was of peripheral concern to the Sixth Amendment how much opportunity the defense got to hammer that point home to the factfinders
4. a military judge has wide discretion to limit repetitive cross-examination or to prohibit cross-examination that may cause confusion

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Witnesses: Scope of Permissible Testimony

1. a judge may limit the defense’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding the terms of a plea agreement entered into by the witness, so long as adequate inquiry into possible bias of that witness has been allowed through other lines of questioning
2. this Court has recognized that the exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination; it does not follow that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness; on the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant
3. a military judge did not impermissibly infringe upon an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by precluding the defense from questioning a witness regarding a specific term of the witness’s pretrial agreement where the judge allowed inquiry into the possible bias and motive to lie of the witness through other questions about his pretrial agreement - specifically that (1) he had a pretrial agreement in his own court-martial; (2) as part of that pretrial agreement he pleaded guilty and entered into a stipulation of facts; (3) he had immunity for his testimony in the accused’s court-martial; (4) his pretrial agreement required him to cooperate with the Government against his best friend; and (5) although he had been sentenced, clemency was still pending in his case, and as part of that process, he would be able to tell the convening authority that he had cooperated and testified against the accused; the limitations placed on cross-examination by the military judge were within his discretion and did not affect the accused’s core constitutional right to cross-examination; once the defense had been allowed to expose the witness’s motivation in testifying, it was of peripheral concern to the Sixth Amendment how much opportunity the defense got to hammer that point home to the factfinders
4. a military judge has wide discretion to limit repetitive cross-examination or to prohibit cross-examination that may cause confusion

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. in evaluating a military judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause, this Court recognizes the military judge’s superior position to evaluate the demeanor of court members; a military judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause will therefore not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion