U.S. v. Mizgala, 61 M.J. 122

Trial Stages: Merits: Guilty Pleas

1. a litigated speedy trial motion under Article 10, UCMJ, is not waived by a subsequent unconditional guilty plea

Trial Stages: Appeals: Generally

1. appellate review of a litigated speedy trial motion under Article 10, UCMJ, is not waived by a subsequent unconditional guilty plea

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. the standard of diligence under which this Court reviews claims of a denial of speedy trial under Article 10 is not constant motion, but reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial; short periods of inactivity are not fatal to an otherwise active prosecution; further, although Sixth Amendment speedy trial standards cannot dictate whether there has been an Article 10 violation, the factors from Barker v. Wingo are an apt structure for examining the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged Article 10 violation
2. this Court’s framework to determine whether the Government proceeded with reasonable diligence under Article 10, UCMJ, includes balancing the following four Barker v. Wingo factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the appellant
3. this Court reviews the decision of whether an accused has received a speedy trial de novo as a legal question, giving substantial deference to a military judge’s findings of fact that will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Generally

1. courts have uniformly held that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of an accused’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act; however, the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to offenses under the UCMJ

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Rule for Courts-Martial 707

1. RCM 707(e) provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any speedy trial issue as to that offense; the language of Article 10 is clearly different from RCM 707 and Article 10 is not restricted by RCM 707; the protections afforded confined or arrested servicemembers under Article 10 are distinct and greater given the nature of other speedy trial protections; and RCM 707(e) does not act as a limitation on the rights afforded under Article 10
2. Article 10 and RCM 707 are distinct, each providing its own speedy trial protection; the fact that a prosecution meets the 120-day rule of RCM 707 does not directly or indirectly demonstrate that the Government moved to trial with reasonable diligence as required by Article 10

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Article 10

1. Article 10, UCMJ, assures the right of a speedy trial to military members by providing that when any person subject to the UCMJ is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the charges and release him where an accused is incarcerated pending disposition of charges under the UCMJ, Congress in Article 10 has placed the onus on the Government to take immediate steps to move that case to trial).
2. this Court has consistently noted that Article 10 creates a more exacting speedy trial demand than does the Sixth Amendment; not only is the demand for a speedy trial under the UCMJ more exacting, by virtue of Article 98, UCMJ, unreasonable delay in disposing of criminal charges in the military is unlawful; while the full scope of this more exacting Article 10 right has not been precisely defined by this Court, it cannot be more exacting and at the same time be consistent with Sixth Amendment protections
3. the language of Article 10 is clearly different from RCM 707, and Article 10 is not restricted by RCM 707(e) which provides that a plea of guilty which results in a finding of guilty waives any speedy trial issue as to that offense; the protections afforded confined or arrested servicemembers under Article 10 are distinct and greater given the nature of other speedy trial protections; and RCM 707(e) does not act as a limitation on the rights afforded under Article 10
4. while the Speedy Trial Act imposes the burden of proof upon an accused to support a motion to dismiss, under Article 10, the Government has the burden to show that the prosecution moved forward with reasonable diligence in response to a motion to dismiss; this distinction is additional proof of the importance of Article 10 to the incarcerated servicemember
5. this Court finds nothing in the comparisons to the Sixth Amendment, RCM 707 or the Speedy Trial Act that would compel its application of their speedy trial waiver rules to Article 10
6. in view of the legislative importance given to a speedy trial under the UCMJ and the unique nature of the protections of Article 10, this Court believes that where an accused unsuccessfully raises an Article 10 issue at trial and thereafter pleads guilty, waiver does not apply; such a rule for Article 10 rights properly reflects the importance of a servicemember’s right to a speedy trial under Article 10; preservation of the right to appeal adverse Article 10 rulings is not only supported by the congressional intent behind Article 10, it also maintains the high standards of speedy disposition of charges against members of the armed forces and recognizes military procedure as the exemplar of prompt action in bringing to trial those members of the armed forces charged with offenses; a fundamental, substantial, personal right should not be diminished by applying ordinary rules of waiver and forfeiture associated with guilty pleas
7. appellate review of a litigated speedy trial motion under Article 10, UCMJ, is not waived by a subsequent unconditional guilty plea
8. the standard of diligence under which this Court reviews claims of a denial of speedy trial under Article 10 is not constant motion, but reasonable diligence in bringing the charges to trial; short periods of inactivity are not fatal to an otherwise active prosecution; further, although Sixth Amendment speedy trial standards cannot dictate whether there has been an Article 10 violation, the factors from Barker v. Wingo are an apt structure for examining the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged Article 10 violation
9. Article 10 and RCM 707 are distinct, each providing its own speedy trial protection; the fact that a prosecution meets the 120-day rule of RCM 707 does not directly or indirectly demonstrate that the Government moved to trial with reasonable diligence as required by Article 10
10. an Article 10 violation rests in the failure of the Government to proceed with reasonable diligence; a conclusion of unreasonable diligence may arise from a number of different causes and need not rise to the level of gross neglect to support a violation
11. it is appropriate to consider the Barker v. Wingo factors in determining whether a particular set of circumstances violates a servicemember’s speedy trial rights under Article 10
12. this Court’s framework to determine whether the Government proceeded with reasonable diligence under Article 10, UCMJ, includes balancing the following four Barker v. Wingo factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the appellant made a demand for a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the appellant
13. in applying the Barker v. Wingo factors under Article 10, the Court remains mindful that it is looking at the proceeding as a whole and not mere speed; the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed; constant motion is not the standard so long as the processing reflects reasonable diligence under all the circumstances; an evaluation must balance the delay against the reasons for the periods of delay
14. an accused who was held in pretrial confinement for 117 days was not denied his right to a speedy trial under Article 10 where (1) once the necessary steps of investigation and coordination with civilian authorities were completed, the Government moved expeditiously to refer the charges; and (2) there was no material prejudice to the accused’s substantial rights where there was no evidence in the record that the conditions of that confinement were harsh or oppressive and there was no indication that his preparation for trial, defense evidence, trial strategy, or ability to present witnesses, on both the merits and sentencing, were compromised by the processing time in the case

Miscellaneous Matters: Speedy Trial: Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

1. the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial; although the text of the amendment does not address waiver, courts have held that the Sixth Amendment right is waived by a voluntary guilty plea; this Court has consistently noted that Article 10 creates a more exacting speedy trial demand than does the Sixth Amendment; not only is the demand for a speedy trial under the UCMJ more exacting, by virtue of Article 98, UCMJ, unreasonable delay in disposing of criminal charges in the military is unlawful; while the full scope of this more exacting Article 10 right has not been precisely defined by this Court, it cannot be more exacting and at the same time be consistent with Sixth Amendment protections