U.S. v. Williams, 60 M.J. 360

Trial Stages: Merits: Pretrial Agreements

1. under R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B), the convening authority may withdraw from a pretrial agreement: (1) at any time before an accused begins performance of his or her promises under the agreement; (2) upon the failure of an accused to fulfill any material promise or condition in the agreement; (3) when inquiry by the military judge discloses a disagreement as to a material term in the agreement; or (4) if findings are set aside because a guilty plea is deemed improvident on appellate review
2. a military judge and counsel must play a critical role to ensure that the record reflects a clear, shared understanding of the terms of any pretrial agreement between an accused and the convening authority
3. in this case, the parties had an underlying disagreement as to the restitution clause itself; under R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B), the convening authority is authorized to withdraw from a pretrial agreement when an inquiry by the military judge discloses such a disagreement as to a material term in the agreement
4. a distinct, separate provision in a pretrial agreement offering to make restitution can provide a significant inducement for a convening authority to accept an accused’s offer to plead guilty; where the record on appeal demonstrates that the accused sought a more favorable pretrial agreement by extending an offer to make restitution and reflects the significance attached by the convening authority to that offer, there can be little doubt that the restitution provision was material to the resultant pretrial agreement
5. in this case, where the inquiry conducted by the military judge clearly established a disagreement as to a material term in the agreement, that circumstance alone provided a factual and legal basis for the convening authority to withdraw; although the military judge’s inquiry did not focus on the disagreement as to a material term component of R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B), his inquiry and the record nonetheless demonstrate that as a proper basis for withdrawal under the rule; because the withdrawal provisions of R.C.M. 705(d)(4)(B) are disjunctive, we need not determine whether there was specific performance or detrimental reliance upon the agreement by the accused nor do we need to address what remedies might be appropriate in a case involving detrimental reliance
6. we do not hold that a convening authority may withdraw from a pretrial agreement by simply claiming that a disagreement exists; rather, the President has required that the existence of a disagreement and the materiality of the terms at issue be ascertained by the military judge through his or her inquiry; that requirement reflects the critical role that a military judge plays during a plea colloquy in ensuring that the record reflects a clear, shared understanding by the parties of the terms of the agreement
7. in this case, we reject the accused’s claim that a withdrawal from the pretrial agreement was improper because the convening authority did not personally make the decision to withdraw; when the SJA recommended to the convening authority that the accused’s offer to plead guilty be accepted, he was induced to do so based on the accused’s offer to make restitution; following their discussion about this case, the SJA believed that the restitution provision was the reason the convening authority approved the offer and he left the office with the clear understanding that if there were no restitution prior to trial, there was no deal; as the SJA knew the circumstances under which the convening authority approved the offer, once those circumstances were no longer present, the trial counsel who had communicated with the SJA on this matter could effect the Government’s withdrawal from the pretrial agreement

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. when a claim involves an interpretation of the pretrial agreement, this Court’s review is de novo