U.S. v. Saferite, 59 M.J. 270

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Credibility

1. during sentencing, as at every other moment of trial testimony, the credibility of a witness is an omnipresent issue; each witness’s credibility determines the authority of the testimony; Section VI of the Military Rules of Evidence is entitled “Witnesses,” but easily could be viewed as “Credibility of Witnesses” as the whole section focuses on technical evidentiary rules to bolster or to attack the credibility of testimony
2. MRE 608 is a key evidentiary rule that covers several methods to bolster or attack the credibility of a witness; these methods include opinion and reputation evidence as to the character of a witness for truthfulness and questions regarding specific instances of conduct that may be relevant to credibility

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Impeachment

1. MRE 608(c) provides that bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach a witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced; evidence of bias can be powerful impeachment; proof of bias is almost always relevant; although extrinsic evidence of specific acts of misconduct may not be used to prove a witness’s general character for truthfulness, it may be used to impeach a witness by showing bias

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Rebuttal

1. the legal function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by the opposing party; the scope of rebuttal is defined by evidence introduced by the other party; rebuttal evidence, like all other evidence, may be excluded pursuant to MRE 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice

Trial Stages: Sentence and Punishment: Evidence

1. the Military Rules of Evidence are applicable to sentencing, thus providing procedural safeguards to ensure the reliability of evidence admitted during sentencing; the military judge may exercise discretion to relax the evidentiary rules for the defense to present sentencing evidence; this relaxation of evidentiary rules goes more to the question of whether the evidence is authentic and reliable and otherwise inadmissible evidence still is not admitted at sentencing
2. MRE 403 applies to sentencing evidence

Trial Stages: Appeals: Harmless / Prejudicial Error

1. we review a military judge’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion; when the military judge conducts a proper balancing test, we will not overturn the ruling to admit the evidence unless there is a clear abuse of discretion
2. in this case, the military judge clearly abused his discretion where although the evidence of his wife’s possible complicity in appellant’s escape from confinement was logically relevant to show her bias in favor of appellant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; the probative value was minimal where the content and tone of her statement convincingly showed her bias as the wife of appellant; evidence of her possible complicity in appellant’s escape added little to establish her bias in her statement; at best, it was merely cumulative on the issue of her bias toward appellant; on the other hand, the danger of unfair prejudice was substantial where the evidence tended merely to allege uncharged misconduct by appellant and show the members the government’s theory that appellant was guilty of conspiring with his wife and involving her in the criminal conduct of his escape; the factual evidence of this theory was tenuous at best; and notwithstanding the factual deficiency to link his wife to appellant’s escape, trial counsel focused his argument on the uncharged misconduct rather than on bias
3. although we identify a danger of unfair prejudice, we further hold that the error was harmless under the particular facts of this case where evidence of appellant’s escape was already before the members, where appellant was tried in absentia, where the military judge carefully instructed the members to sentence appellant only for the offenses of which he was convicted, and where the maximum period of confinement was 230 years, the trial counsel asked for 16 years confinement, and the members imposed confinement for only six years