U.S. v. Perron, 58 M.J. 78

Trial Stages: Merits: Guilty Pleas

1. the decision to plead guilty is a serious and consequential decision; a plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; a guilty plea is also a sobering decision because it involves the waiver of a number of individual constitutional rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers
2. because of the consequences resulting from guilty pleas, it is constitutionally necessary to ensure that such pleas are entered into voluntarily and knowingly, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences; where a plea is not knowing and voluntary, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void
3. the military justice system imposes even stricter standards on military judges with regards to guilty pleas than those imposed on federal civilian judges; Article 45(a), UCMJ, requires military judges, unlike civilian judges, to resolve inconsistencies and defenses during the providence inquiry or the guilty plea must be rejected; this Court has imposed an affirmative duty on military judges, during providence inquiries, to conduct a detailed inquiry into the offenses charged, the accused’s understanding of the elements of each offense, the accused’s conduct, and the accused’s willingness to plead guilty; that general mandate to insure that pleas are voluntary is now contained in R.C.M. 910(d)

Trial Stages: Merits: Pretrial Agreements

1. it is fundamental to a knowing and intelligent plea that where an accused pleads guilty in reliance on promises made by the Government in a pretrial agreement, the voluntariness of that plea depends on the fulfillment of those promises by the Government
2. where there is a mutual misunderstanding regarding a material term of a pretrial agreement, resulting in an accused not receiving the benefit of his bargain, the accused’s pleas are improvident; remedial action, in the form of specific performance, withdrawal of the plea, or alternative relief, is required
3. when it becomes apparent that a material provision in a pretrial agreement is ineffective, appellant’s pleas become involuntary and improvident, warranting relief
4. when an appellate court substitutes its own remedies in place of negotiated plea terms, it steps into the accused’s shoes and is in effect renegotiating the accused’s plea agreement and waiving his rights; this an appellate court cannot do without the accused’s consent
5. where the accused does not agree that a particular form of relief rectifies a failed material term and provides him with the benefit of the bargain--and therefore calls into question the voluntariness of the guilty plea—it is doubtful that an appellate court could, nevertheless, determine with a necessary degree of certainty that the accused would have pleaded guilty had he been offered the relief he is ultimately being compelled to accept
6. where the failed term in the agreement involves pure economic concerns, finding relief of equal value is possible; but where the promised benefit relates to non-economic concerns--e.g. the immediate care of a family--or where the promise has indeterminable value, determining the benefit of the bargain becomes a guessing game, and may result in undervaluing the promised benefit to the accused
7. remedies for the failure of a material term in a pretrial agreement must ultimately support a conclusion that the plea was voluntary, and imposing alternative relief on an unwilling appellant does not do this
8. imposing alternative relief on an unwilling appellant to rectify a mutual misunderstanding of a material term in a pretrial agreement violates the appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process; an appellate court may determine that alternatives to specific performance or withdrawal of a plea could provide an appellant with the benefit of his or her bargain--and may remand the case to the convening authority to determine whether doing so is advisable--but it cannot impose such a remedy on an appellant in the absence of the appellant’s acceptance of that remedy
9. a pretrial agreement is an agreement between the convening authority and the accused; an appellant cannot dictate the terms of a pretrial agreement to the convening authority; this is true on review as well as at the outset; in other words, if the parties cannot agree on alternative relief, and specific performance is not available, the result is to nullify the original pretrial agreement, returning the parties to the status quo ante