U.S. v. Robinson, 58 M.J. 429

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Evidence: Search and Seizure › Investigatory stop

1. an investigative stop of an individual is permissible under the Fourth Amendment where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot; similarly, an investigative stop of a motor vehicle is constitutionally permissible where there is reasonable suspicion that the occupants are engaged in wrongdoing; based on the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity
2. the concept of particularized suspicion has two elements; the first element is that the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances; the second element of the particularized suspicion required is that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing
3. the factual basis for reasonable suspicion must be more than a mere hunch; however, it need not rise to the level of probable cause, and it falls considerably short of a preponderance of the evidence
4. in considering the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officer may consider a series of acts which are innocent in themselves, but which, taken together, warrant further investigation; while mere presence in a high-crime area, standing alone, is insufficient for reasonable suspicion, it is a relevant contextual consideration; unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such; evasive behavior is a relevant consideration; the fact that a vehicle appears out of place is relevant; and finally, the time of day is relevant
5. the facts found by the military judge were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop of appellant's vehicle where the police officer twice observed appellant's vehicle in a high crime area at an unusual time, where appellant’s vehicle was out of place and appellant’s presence was unusual, and where appellant made a sudden turn into an unpaved alley that was (1) evasive, (2) an indicator of impaired driving, and (3) unusual because it was a sudden turn into an alley that was not a customary roadway

Trial Stages: Appeals: Standards of Review, Burdens, etc.

1. we review issues involving reasonable suspicion that a person was engaged in criminal activity de novo
2. when we review a military judge’s ruling to admit or suppress evidence, we review the military judge’s factfinding under the clearly-erroneous standard and conclusions of law de novo
3. although the military judge erroneously concluded that the police officer had probable cause to stop appellant for a traffic violation, the military judge’s error was harmless, because the military judge reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason; the facts found by the military judge were sufficient to establish the police officer's reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop