U.S. v. Sanchez, 53 M.J. 393

First Principles: Constitutional Matters: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

1. appellant, a victim of ongoing verbal sexual harassment by other inmates while confined in the brig, did not suffer cruel and unusual punishment as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, and the record did not establish the requisite state of mind for an Eighth Amendment violation
2. not only is the Eighth Amendment designed to prevent barbaric and torturous forms of punishment, it also prohibits “punishments which are incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’… or which ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain[.]’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)
3. two factors must be present for an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement to succeed: (1) objectively, the acts or omissions must result in the denial of necessities and be sufficiently serious; and (2) subjectively, there must be a culpable state of mind, one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety
4. sexual harassment may, in some circumstances, rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment
5. while psychological pain might be actionable under the Eighth Amendment, it seems that any such claim would have to be based upon a well-established and clinically diagnosed anxiety or depression
6. even under a flexible standard of what constitutes pain for purposes of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, appellant failed to show that sexual harassment directed at her by other inmates while in the brig resulted in any physical harm or clinically documented psychological trauma
7. the state of mind component of the test for cruel and unusual punishment requires deliberate indifference to the victim’s fear and pain; prison guards and officials must be consciously aware of the risk or danger to an inmate and choose to ignore it; they must have been aware of the harm or risk of harm caused the inmate, and continued anyway; the officials must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and they must also draw the inference
8. appellant did not demonstrate the requisite deliberate indifference to her fear and pain resulting from sexual harassment by other inmates while she was in the brig: (1) she did not tell the guards or supervisors that she was being offended and harassed by other inmates; (2) officials were not aware of facts and, thus, could not have drawn inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed; and (3) once appellant did report the harassment to the commanding officer, the commander instituted a full investigation