U.S. v. Knight, 52 M.J. 47

Core Criminal Law Subjects: Crimes: Article 93 - Cruelty and Maltreatment Pre-2019 offenses

1. it was not necessary to determine whether Article 93, UCMJ, has an “officiality” requirement where appellant pleaded guilty and admitted that his conduct violated the maltreatment prohibition, admitted that he used a phony credit card known to be derived from confidential information in appellant’s official control as a result of military duties, and knew that his conduct would cause the victim command embarrassment
2. appellant’s construction of Article 93, UCMJ, as requiring the prosecution to show that appellant was acting in a supervisory role when he maltreated the victim is not supported by the plain language of the statute, but under the circumstances of appellant’s guilty plea the CAAF did not decide that legal question
3. even accepting the argument that Article 93, UCMJ, requires a supervisory relationship to support a charge of maltreatment, appellant’s plea is provident in that appellant admitted the alleged victim was subject to his orders, that appellant was the noncommissioned officer in charge, that the victim was one of appellant’s section chiefs, and that appellant exploited confidential personnel information available to appellant because of his command position over the victim

Trial Stages: Merits: Guilty Pleas

1. guilty plea was provident and it was not necessary to determine whether Article 93, UCMJ, has an “officiality” requirement where appellant pleaded guilty and admitted that his conduct violated the maltreatment prohibition, admitted that he used a phony credit card known to be derived from confidential information in appellant’s official control as a result of military duties, and knew that his conduct would cause the victim command embarrassment
2. even accepting the argument that Article 93, UCMJ, requires a supervisory relationship to support a charge of maltreatment, appellant’s plea is provident in that appellant admitted the alleged victim was subject to his orders, that appellant was the noncommissioned officer in charge, that the victim was one of appellant’s section chiefs, and that appellant exploited confidential personnel information available to appellant because of his command position over the victim