U.S. v. Armon, 51 M.J. 83

Trial Stages: Sentence and Punishment: Evidence

1. (RCM 1001(b)(5)(A) permits sentencing evidence consisting of opinions on the accused’s rehabilitative potential, but such opinions must be based on sufficient information and knowledge about the accused to offer a rationally based opinion that is helpful to the sentencing authority (RCM 1001(b)(5)(B)) and must be based on information and knowledge of the accused’s personal circumstances (RCM 1001(b)(5)(C))
2. opinion evidence on rehabilitative potential offered during sentencing may not be based principally on the severity or nature of the accused’s offenses
3. RCM 1001(b)(5)(D) prohibits testimony about the appropriateness of a punitive discharge or whether the accused should be returned to the accused’s unit
4. pursuant to RCM 1001(b)(4), sentencing witness who did not personally know accused and was not familiar with his service record may testify about: witness’s emotional reaction to the accused’s misconduct; how accused’s misconduct had been personally offensive to other soldiers; and how accused’s misconduct was detrimental to the trust and confidence required among soldiers in combat
5. comment by sentencing witness who did not personally know accused and was not familiar with his service record that he did not want accused around in a combat jump could be construed as an indirect way of saying he did not want accused in unit, and such testimony would violate RCM 1001(b)(5)(D) prohibition against testimony about whether the accused should be returned to the accused’s unit
6. sentencing witness’s description of the dangers caused by accused’s misrepresentation of his qualifications and experience was admissible under RCM 1001(b)(4), and witness’s opinion about accused’s ability to lead troops was permissible under RCM 1001(b)(5) where that witness supervised and knew accused
7. sentencing witness’s description of special bond among soldiers who jump into combat and his emotional reaction to accused’s misconduct were admissible under RCM 1001(b)(4)
8. sentencing witness’s comment about accused’s ability to lead troops was a reflection on accused’s status as a noncommissioned officer; witness stopped short of suggesting there was no place in the Army for the accused
9. sentencing witness’s comment that he would not want to serve in a unit with the accused facially runs afoul of the spirit, if not the letter, of RCM 1101(b)(5)(D); however, where this testimony was presented in the context of unit morale and discipline, in the context of the need for integrity and trust in the service, and referred to in terms of the emotional pain inflicted upon the witness by the accused’s misconduct, the testimony was admissible under RCM 1001(b)(4)