Summary of changes

Article 113 — Drunken or reckless operation of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel

The text as it stood in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition beside the current text, provision by provision, with every recorded amendment and the authority behind it — the whole Article in one view.

0 amended 0 added 0 removed 35 unchanged
No changes recorded for this Article — its text is the same as the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition.
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Provisions
51.a. unchanged
Original text
Text of statute.
Current text
Text of statute.
51.a.(a) unchanged
Original text
Any person subject to this chapter who—
Current text
Any person subject to this chapter who—
51.a.(a)(1) unchanged
Original text
operates or physically controls any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in a reckless or wanton manner or while impaired by a substance described in section 912a(b) of this title (article 112a(b)), or
Current text
operates or physically controls any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in a reckless or wanton manner or while impaired by a substance described in section 912a(b) of this title (article 112a(b)), or
51.a.(a)(2) unchanged
Original text
operates or is in actual physical control of any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath is equal to or exceeds the applicable limit under subsection (b), shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. (b)(1) For purposes of subsection (a), the applicable limit on the alcohol concentration in a person’s blood or breath is as follows:
Current text
operates or is in actual physical control of any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath is equal to or exceeds the applicable limit under subsection (b), shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. (b)(1) For purposes of subsection (a), the applicable limit on the alcohol concentration in a person’s blood or breath is as follows:
51.a.(a)(2)(A) unchanged
Original text
In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in the United States, such limit is the lesser of—
Current text
In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in the United States, such limit is the lesser of—
51.a.(a)(2)(A)(i) unchanged
Original text
the blood alcohol content limit under the law of the State in which the conduct occurred, except as may be provided under paragraph (2) for conduct on a military installation that is in more than one State; or
Current text
the blood alcohol content limit under the law of the State in which the conduct occurred, except as may be provided under paragraph (2) for conduct on a military installation that is in more than one State; or
51.a.(a)(2)(A)(ii) unchanged
Original text
the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3).
Current text
the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3).
51.a.(a)(2)(B) unchanged
Original text
In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel outside the United States, the applicable blood alcohol content limit is the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3) or such lower limit as the Secretary of Defense may by regulation prescribe. (2) In the case of a military installation that is in more than one State, if those States have different blood alcohol content limits under their respective State laws, the Secretary may select one such blood alcohol content limit to apply uniformly on that installation.
Current text
In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel outside the United States, the applicable blood alcohol content limit is the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3) or such lower limit as the Secretary of Defense may by regulation prescribe. (2) In the case of a military installation that is in more than one State, if those States have different blood alcohol content limits under their respective State laws, the Secretary may select one such blood alcohol content limit to apply uniformly on that installation.
51.a.(a)(3) unchanged
Original text
For purposes of paragraph (1), the blood alcohol content limit with respect to alcohol concentration in a person’s blood is 0.08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and with respect to alcohol concentration in a person’s breath is 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, as shown by chemical analysis. The Secretary may by regulation prescribe limits that are lower than the limits specified in the preceding sentence, if such lower limits are based on scientific developments, as reflected in Federal law of general applicability.
Current text
For purposes of paragraph (1), the blood alcohol content limit with respect to alcohol concentration in a person’s blood is 0.08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and with respect to alcohol concentration in a person’s breath is 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, as shown by chemical analysis. The Secretary may by regulation prescribe limits that are lower than the limits specified in the preceding sentence, if such lower limits are based on scientific developments, as reflected in Federal law of general applicability.
51.a.(a)(4) unchanged
Original text
In this subsection:
Current text
In this subsection:
51.a.(a)(4)(A) unchanged
Original text
The term “blood alcohol content limit” means the amount of alcohol concentration in a person’s blood or breath at which operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel is prohibited.
Current text
The term “blood alcohol content limit” means the amount of alcohol concentration in a person’s blood or breath at which operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel is prohibited.
51.a.(a)(4)(B) unchanged
Original text
The term “United States” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa and the term “State” includes each of those jurisdictions.
Current text
The term “United States” includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa and the term “State” includes each of those jurisdictions.
51.b. unchanged
Original text
Elements.
Current text
Elements.
51.b.(1) unchanged
Original text
That the accused was operating or in physical control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel; and
Current text
That the accused was operating or in physical control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel; and
51.b.(2) unchanged
Original text
That while operating or in physical control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel, the accused—
Current text
That while operating or in physical control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel, the accused—
51.b.(2)(a) unchanged
Original text
did so in a wanton or reckless manner; or
Current text
did so in a wanton or reckless manner; or
51.b.(2)(b) unchanged
Original text
was drunk or impaired; or
Current text
was drunk or impaired; or
51.b.(2)(c) unchanged
Original text
the alcohol concentration in the accused’s blood or breath equaled or exceeded the applicable limit under Article 113(b).
Current text
the alcohol concentration in the accused’s blood or breath equaled or exceeded the applicable limit under Article 113(b).
51.b.(2)(c)|N unchanged
Original text
[Note: Add the following if applicable]
Current text
[Note: Add the following if applicable]
51.b.(3) unchanged
Original text
That the accused thereby caused the vehicle, aircraft, or vessel to injure a person.
Current text
That the accused thereby caused the vehicle, aircraft, or vessel to injure a person.
51.c. unchanged
Original text
Explanation.
Current text
Explanation.
51.c.(1) unchanged
Original text
Vehicle.
See 1 U.S.C. § 4.
Current text
Vehicle.
See 1 U.S.C. § 4.
51.c.(2) unchanged
Original text
Vessel.
See 1 U.S.C. § 3.
Current text
Vessel.
See 1 U.S.C. § 3.
51.c.(3) unchanged
Original text
Aircraft.
See 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(1).
Current text
Aircraft.
See 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(1).
51.c.(4) unchanged
Original text
Operates.
Operating a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel includes not only driving or guiding a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while it is in motion, either in person or through the agency of another, but also setting of its motive power in action or the manipulation of its controls so as to cause the particular vehicle, aircraft, or vessel to move.
Current text
Operates.
Operating a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel includes not only driving or guiding a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while it is in motion, either in person or through the agency of another, but also setting of its motive power in action or the manipulation of its controls so as to cause the particular vehicle, aircraft, or vessel to move.
51.c.(5) unchanged
Original text
Physical control and actual physical control.
These terms as used in the statute are synonymous. They describe the present capability and power to dominate, direct, or regulate the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, either in person or through the agency of another, regardless of whether such vehicle, aircraft, or vessel is operated. For example, the intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a vehicle with the keys of the vehicle in or near the ignition but with the engine not turned on could be deemed in actual physical control of that vehicle. However, the person asleep in the back seat with the keys in his or her pocket would not be deemed in actual physical control. Physical control necessarily encompasses operation.
Current text
Physical control and actual physical control.
These terms as used in the statute are synonymous. They describe the present capability and power to dominate, direct, or regulate the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, either in person or through the agency of another, regardless of whether such vehicle, aircraft, or vessel is operated. For example, the intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a vehicle with the keys of the vehicle in or near the ignition but with the engine not turned on could be deemed in actual physical control of that vehicle. However, the person asleep in the back seat with the keys in his or her pocket would not be deemed in actual physical control. Physical control necessarily encompasses operation.
51.c.(6) unchanged
Original text
Drunk or impaired.
Drunk and impaired mean any intoxication which is sufficient to impair the rational and full exercise of the mental or physical faculties. The term drunk is used in relation to intoxication by alcohol. The term impaired is used in relation to intoxication by a substance described in Article 112(a).
Current text
Drunk or impaired.
Drunk and impaired mean any intoxication which is sufficient to impair the rational and full exercise of the mental or physical faculties. The term drunk is used in relation to intoxication by alcohol. The term impaired is used in relation to intoxication by a substance described in Article 112(a).
51.c.(7) unchanged
Original text
Reckless.
The operation or physical control of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft is reckless when it exhibits a culpable disregard of foreseeable consequences to others from the act or omission involved. Recklessness is not determined solely by reason of the happening of an injury, or the invasion of the rights of another, nor by proof alone of excessive speed or erratic operation, but all these factors may be admissible and relevant as bearing upon the ultimate question: whether, under all the circumstances, the accused’s manner of operation or physical control of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft was of that heedless nature which made it actually or imminently dangerous to the occupants, or to the rights or safety of others. It is operating or physically controlling a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft with such a high degree of negligence that if death were caused, the accused would have committed involuntary manslaughter, at least. The nature of the conditions in which the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft is operated or controlled, the time of day or night, the proximity and number of other vehicles, vessels, or aircraft and the condition of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, are often matters of importance in the proof of an offense charged under this article and, where they are of importance, may properly be alleged.
Current text
Reckless.
The operation or physical control of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft is reckless when it exhibits a culpable disregard of foreseeable consequences to others from the act or omission involved. Recklessness is not determined solely by reason of the happening of an injury, or the invasion of the rights of another, nor by proof alone of excessive speed or erratic operation, but all these factors may be admissible and relevant as bearing upon the ultimate question: whether, under all the circumstances, the accused’s manner of operation or physical control of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft was of that heedless nature which made it actually or imminently dangerous to the occupants, or to the rights or safety of others. It is operating or physically controlling a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft with such a high degree of negligence that if death were caused, the accused would have committed involuntary manslaughter, at least. The nature of the conditions in which the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft is operated or controlled, the time of day or night, the proximity and number of other vehicles, vessels, or aircraft and the condition of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, are often matters of importance in the proof of an offense charged under this article and, where they are of importance, may properly be alleged.
51.c.(8) unchanged
Original text
Wanton.
Wanton includes “reckless,” but in describing the operation or physical control of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, wanton may, in a proper case, connote willfulness, or a disregard of probable consequences, and thus describe a more aggravated offense.
Current text
Wanton.
Wanton includes “reckless,” but in describing the operation or physical control of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, wanton may, in a proper case, connote willfulness, or a disregard of probable consequences, and thus describe a more aggravated offense.
51.c.(9) unchanged
Original text
Causation.
The accused’s drunken or reckless driving must be a proximate cause of injury for the accused to be guilty of drunken or reckless driving resulting in personal injury. To be proximate, the accused’s actions need not be the sole cause of the injury, nor must they be the immediate cause of the injury, that is, the latest in time and space preceding the injury. A contributing cause is deemed proximate only if it plays a material role in the victim’s injury.
Current text
Causation.
The accused’s drunken or reckless driving must be a proximate cause of injury for the accused to be guilty of drunken or reckless driving resulting in personal injury. To be proximate, the accused’s actions need not be the sole cause of the injury, nor must they be the immediate cause of the injury, that is, the latest in time and space preceding the injury. A contributing cause is deemed proximate only if it plays a material role in the victim’s injury.
51.c.(10) unchanged
Original text
Separate offenses.
While the same course of conduct may constitute violations of both paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of Article 113, e.g., both drunken and reckless operation or physical control, this article proscribes the conduct described in both paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) as separate offenses, which may be charged separately. However, as recklessness is a relative matter, evidence of all the surrounding circumstances that made the operation dangerous, whether alleged or not, may be admissible. Thus, on a charge of reckless driving, for example, evidence of drunkenness might be admissible as establishing one aspect of the recklessness, and evidence that the vehicle exceeded a safe speed, at a relevant prior point and time, might be admissible as corroborating other evidence of the specific recklessness charged. Similarly, on a charge of drunken driving, relevant evidence of recklessness might have probative value as corroborating other proof of drunkenness.
Current text
Separate offenses.
While the same course of conduct may constitute violations of both paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of Article 113, e.g., both drunken and reckless operation or physical control, this article proscribes the conduct described in both paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) as separate offenses, which may be charged separately. However, as recklessness is a relative matter, evidence of all the surrounding circumstances that made the operation dangerous, whether alleged or not, may be admissible. Thus, on a charge of reckless driving, for example, evidence of drunkenness might be admissible as establishing one aspect of the recklessness, and evidence that the vehicle exceeded a safe speed, at a relevant prior point and time, might be admissible as corroborating other evidence of the specific recklessness charged. Similarly, on a charge of drunken driving, relevant evidence of recklessness might have probative value as corroborating other proof of drunkenness.
51.d. unchanged
Original text
Maximum punishment.
Current text
Maximum punishment.
51.d.(1) unchanged
Original text
Resulting in personal injury.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 18 months.
Current text
Resulting in personal injury.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 18 months.
51.d.(2) unchanged
Original text
No personal injury involved.
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 months.
Current text
No personal injury involved.
Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 6 months.
51.e. unchanged
Original text
Sample specification.
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about _____, 20 __, (in the motor pool area) (near the Officers’ Club) (at the intersection of __________ and __________) (while in the Gulf of Mexico) (while in flight over North America) physically control [a vehicle, to wit: (a truck) (a passenger car) (_____)] [an aircraft, to wit: (an AH- 64 helicopter) (an F-14A fighter) (a KC-135 tanker) (_____)] [a vessel, to wit: (the aircraft carrier USS __________) (the Coast Guard Cutter __________) (__________)], [while drunk] [while impaired by __________] [while the alcohol concentration in (his) (her) (blood or breath) equaled or exceeded the applicable limit under subsection (b) of the text of the statute in paragraph 51 as shown by chemical analysis] [in a (reckless) (wanton) manner by (attempting to pass another vehicle on a sharp curve) (ordering that the aircraft be flown below the authorized altitude)] [and did thereby cause said (vehicle) (aircraft) (vessel) to (strike and) (injure __________)].
Current text
Sample specification.
In that __________ (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board—location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about _____, 20 __, (in the motor pool area) (near the Officers’ Club) (at the intersection of __________ and __________) (while in the Gulf of Mexico) (while in flight over North America) physically control [a vehicle, to wit: (a truck) (a passenger car) (_____)] [an aircraft, to wit: (an AH- 64 helicopter) (an F-14A fighter) (a KC-135 tanker) (_____)] [a vessel, to wit: (the aircraft carrier USS __________) (the Coast Guard Cutter __________) (__________)], [while drunk] [while impaired by __________] [while the alcohol concentration in (his) (her) (blood or breath) equaled or exceeded the applicable limit under subsection (b) of the text of the statute in paragraph 51 as shown by chemical analysis] [in a (reckless) (wanton) manner by (attempting to pass another vehicle on a sharp curve) (ordering that the aircraft be flown below the authorized altitude)] [and did thereby cause said (vehicle) (aircraft) (vessel) to (strike and) (injure __________)].

“Original text” is the state captured the first time a provision was edited under change tracking — i.e. the text as published in the last Manual for Courts-Martial edition. Provisions edited without being “marked as changed” (typos, formatting) are not recorded here; see the recent revisions feed and the site-wide changes log.